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ABSTRACT
Recent events remind us of the importance and fragility of the institutions that undergird a healthy democracy.
This article steps away from the speech-and-corruption debates dominating campaign finance since Buckley v.
Valeo to suggest an approach it calls “neo-Madisonian.” It begins with the Federalists’ views about fostering a
multi-factional and deliberative Congress but tempers their vision with departures relating to parties and pluralism.
The article agrees with scholars who see parties as important but disagrees with shaping campaign finance to
enhance national party leaders. The time members spend raising funds instead of legislating, the use of member
“dues” to select committees, and repeated “message voting,” are symptoms of a larger party-related disease that
feeds polarization and hinders Congress’s ability to perform its needed role.
With respect to pluralism, the article argues that Madison’s large-republic framework has clear advantages but
leaves too many outside. Accepting the advantages of size should carry with it a duty to address this shortcoming.
Small-donor public financing is often proposed as a remedy. The article refutes claims that link small donors to
extremism. Nevertheless, the article does point out important risks. To address the risks, it puts forward empirical
analysis to support a new approach adopted in New York State that will target generous public financing to
empower within-district small donors.
The article thus casts a metaphorical net in two directions—urging reformers to take institutions seriously, while
urging institutionalists to reach out to those left aside. These goals are not contradictory. Public resources can
help correct pluralism’s flaws, but the correction should simultaneously serve institutional goals for the common
good.
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INTRODUCTION
This article has been shaped partly by surrounding events. The words
were written during a time of pandemic-inspired uncertainty, overlaid by
concerns about racial equality, polarization, and violence. Like global
warming and structural budget issues, these matters will take years to address.
Positive action will involve costs; inaction will cost more. None will be easy
politically. Balancing and a sense of shared enterprise will be crucial. If the
United States is to provide future generations with the opportunities of those
past—indeed, if it is to provide better opportunities for a broader swath of its
citizens—its representative institutions need to be repaired. Those
institutions need to encourage thoughtful deliberation better than they do
now. But they also need to incorporate more voices and their policies must
be accepted broadly as legitimate. All of those features are important for
healthy institutions in a democracy, and institutional health is a precondition
for long-term success.
The article, therefore, steps away from the speech-and-corruption
debates dominating campaign finance since the Buckley v. Valeo decision of
1976.1 When considering policy, as opposed to constitutionality, it urges a
bifocal lens that views the effects of any proposal on the institutions of
government while at the same time striving to incorporate a full range of voices
into the process in a manner that satisfies constitutional requirements. The
need for an institutional lens may seem obvious but is not. A literature review
of the justifications scholars and policymakers put forward when discussing
money-in-politics shows a remarkably large number of goals. These include
reducing corruption, equalizing political power, fostering greater diversity
among donors and officeholders, heightening competition, and changing the
conduct of election campaigns. (A compilation of these objectives, with
citations, appears as an Appendix to this article.) While a number of these
goals can be thought of as important parts of the whole, it is nevertheless
striking that almost none gives primary emphasis to the performance of
representative legislatures.
To counterbalance such relative silence, this article offers an alternative
perspective it calls neo-Madisonian. This vantage point is closely related to
one that political scientists might describe as being neo-institutionalist. An
institutional or neo-institutional approach is one that sees institutional rules
and norms structuring both the way politicians gain office and the flow of

1

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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decision-making within office. The rules and norms create incentives to
channel the behavior of officeholders, along with certain aspects of the
policies they produce. The approach is called neo-Madisonian (to
emphasize the second half of the phrase) because it begins from the
“improvements” in political science that James Madison and his colleagues
put forward at the time of the Constitution’s framing. Specifically, Madison
and his Federalist colleagues wanted to create a legislative branch whose
members felt an incentive to deliberate, bargain and compromise as they
formed governing majorities out of a purposely complex multiplicity of
factions.
These goals have felt distant in recent years. The use of force to disrupt
the orderly transition of power can make a concern for its opposite,
deliberation, seem quaint. And yet, those actions highlight how important
the institutions of democracy can be. This article will argue for the continued
importance of promoting—or at least not further undermining—Madison’s
vision of a deliberative legislature, whatever else one may be trying to
accomplish.
However, the approach in this article is called neo-Madisonian
(emphasizing the phrase’s first half) because of two major departures from
the original. The first involves the role of political parties in contemporary
politics; the second is about correcting a flaw. With respect to political
parties, this article—like Madison himself in the 1790s—recognizes that the
government’s formal institutions have to be supplemented by parties to fill
out the original design. In this respect, the article shares much with modern
party scholars who criticize some reformers’ inattention, or even hostility, to
the role parties can play. However, the article parts company with many of
these scholars over the vision of parties put forward. Many of them argue
for strengthening national party organizations. This article will claim that
the strong local and state parties of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century did support Madisonian goals, but today’s polarized and
nationalized parties have been helping to thwart them. For that reason, the
second section of this article will lay bare how current fundraising and
committee selection practices undermine deliberation, with the power of
nationalized parties and party leaders sitting at the heart of the malady.
The other departure from a purely Madisonian vision relates to one of its
key side-effects. The article will argue that precisely because of its positive
qualities, it is important to acknowledge and work toward correcting a major
problem that the scope and complexity of a large republic help exacerbate.
The system is designed to promote bargaining and compromise among a
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multiplicity of factions, but only among those who are represented at the
bargaining table. Complexity makes majority tyranny less likely, but it also
makes it harder for some to be heard. The third and longest section of the
article, therefore, argues that accepting the benefits of Madisonian
institutions should come together with an obligation to address this effect.
The campaign finance system cannot resolve the problem by itself, but it can
help further this end by giving citizens a stronger incentive to make small
contributions and giving candidates a stronger incentive to mobilize small
donors. Doing so is fully consistent with current constitutional law.
There has been concern that this approach could overshoot its intended
mark. It is said that small donors foster ideological extremism within the
parties, making bargaining and deliberation across parties more difficult.
This article reviews the evidence and concludes it does not support the claims
about extremism. However, there is reason to feel concerned about
something related. Closer to the heart of the problem is a nationalization of
active interest groups and parties, sorted into hostile camps, with not enough
play in the joints for a more flexible form of deliberation by legislators. Using
public funds to increase the value of contributions from a national cadre of
internet-activated donors could deepen this problem. As a policy response,
the article therefore argues for using public money to heighten the role of
small-donor constituents. As an example, it presents a detailed analysis
(including predictive modeling) of a just-enacted New York State law that
will offer generous matching funds not to multiply the value of internet-based
national networks, but to enhance the importance of local small donors.
Finally, the article draws boundaries around its argument. It does not
claim that sound campaign finance policies would by themselves be powerful
enough to reverse the forces that polarize legislatures. But they can help, and
they can do so while taking a serious step to counter one of the original
Madisonian framework’s key flaws.
I. A NEO-MADISONIAN PERSPECTIVE
James Madison had nothing to say about what we now think of narrowly
as the subject of campaign finance. To be sure, he and his colleagues spoke
a great deal about minimizing corruption in elections and government,2 but
not directly about political campaign expenditures. Nevertheless, this article
will argue that the Federalist perspective on elections and institutions offers
2

See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX
TO CITIZENS UNITED, chs. 2-3 (2014).
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a good vantage point for thinking about precisely this subject. It will not
present the historical Madison’s views on free speech3 or claim that he would
have agreed with the policies to be put forward here. Rather, this is about
the importance of institutions in shaping behavior in a democratic republic.
A. Madison
It is tempting to begin analyzing Madison by going straight to Federalist
No. 10, but this would start in the middle. Federalist No. 10 was a response to
an argument made by opponents of the Constitution who shared many core
principles with the Constitution’s supporters.4 Almost all of the Federalists
and Anti-Federalists of 1787-89 agreed that a new government should be
republican in form. Or, as Madison stated forcefully in Federalist Nos. 46, 51,
and 52, the government ultimately should be “dependent” upon the people.5
The major disagreement was about what kind of democratic republic it
should be.
As is well known, Anti-Federalists generally accepted
Montesquieu’s classical view that liberty is best nurtured in a small republic.6
Madison rejected this in the Federalists’ most original contribution to
political thought, which appeared most fully in Federalist No. 10. In that
paper Madison said the best way to prevent a durable and cohesive majority
from running roughshod over the minority in a democratic republic is to
extend the republic’s sphere and encourage a multiplicity of factions to form,
thus making it hard for one faction to dominate.
This part of Madison’s argument is familiar but negative. It is about
preventing or delaying bad outcomes. But prevention was not the
Constitution’s end goal. The animating spirit was to create a government
powerful enough to act in the public interest and with a will to do so. In this
spirit, Federalist 10 shifted to the positive effects of a large republic. Large
republics had to be indirect (rather than direct) democracies based on
delegation or representation. This, in turn, would have independent effects
on the system.
The effect [of delegation] . . . is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of

3

4
5
6

For one recent article that interprets the historic Madison campaign practices in a speech and
campaign finance context, see Anthony J. Gaughan, James Madison, Citizens United, and the
Constitutional Problem of Corruption, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 101, 140 (2020).
See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1981).
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, AND JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST, (Jacob E. Cooke,
ed. 1961). Hereinafter cited as THE FEDERALIST.
See STORING, supra note 4, at 15-23.
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citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country
. . . . On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious
tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by
corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
interests, of the people[.]7

It is important not to be deceived by the first part of this description.
Representation will refine and enlarge the public’s views. But the word
“refining” was being used in the sense of distilling or purifying.8 If done
properly, this may serve the common good.9 However, Madison was also
making clear that representation could refine (distill or intensify) in a manner
that betrayed the public interest by intensifying a majority’s desire for
immediate benefits at the expense of a minority or at the expense of the
longer-term national interest. As this author has written elsewhere, “The
aim of the Constitution’s provisions on Congress was to create a
representative body that would improve upon the public’s views, instead of
making them worse.”10
This is pursued through what Hamilton described in Federalist No. 9 as
an improved science of politics.11 That science assumed office-holders (like
most people) would act most of the time out of self-interest or ambition. The
best-known statement is in the famous comment in Federalist No. 51 about
relying on ambition to counter ambition to preserve the balance of political
power across institutions. But structural rules were also meant to shape the
incentives for behavior within institutions. For example, large congressional
districts meant that representatives would likely have to appeal to many
factions to be elected. Within the legislature, multiple factions meant that
bargaining and compromise would be needed to enact laws. And because
factions form around and across multiple interests, majorities would be fluid.
This would be true from the outset but would become even more so as the
7
8

9
10
11

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
Garry Wills also connects the notion of “refining” with distilling and purifying in GARRY WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 225-30 (1981). Wills’ analysis offers a thoughtful
explanation of how refining and filtering might work to promote public virtue, but neither he nor
others he cites pick up on the second possibility—that representative institutions could “invert” the
effects if they were poorly designed.
See infra note 15 about pluralism for further comment on the notions of the “public interest” and
“common good” in Madison’s thought, as opposed to that of some modern pluralists.
Michael J. Malbin, Congress During the Convention and Ratification, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185-208, 188 (L. Levy & D. Mahoney eds., 1987).
THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). On the science, see Douglass Adair, “That Politics
May Be Reduced to a Science”: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON
LIBR. Q. 343-60 (1957). On the notion of a “new” science of politics, see Charles R. Kesler, Federalist
10 and American Republicanism, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING, 13-39 (C. Kesler ed., 1987).
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commercial economy became more complex and interests coalesced around
the different kinds as well as amounts of property.12 And, finally, large districts
would permit the legislature to be small enough to deliberate. As Madison
wrote in Federalist No. 55, the sheer number of people in a room will affect
the quality of deliberation, no matter what the intentions or capabilities of
the individuals may be. “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever
character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would
still have been a mob.”13 It is perhaps not coincidental that the size of the
House in the First Congress, where deliberations took place in the
Committee of the Whole, was about the same as that of a large standing
committee today, which arguably are the bodies within today’s Congress best
suited for Madisonian-style deliberation.
In the electoral sphere, terms of office were made long enough to give
Senators and (to a lesser extent) House members enough time to have some
breathing space between legislating and the next election. Consistent with
this, the framers rejected proposals to give constituents the power to instruct
their representatives or recall them midterm. Even though members of
Congress (and especially House members) were to be “dependent upon” the
people, they were not put in office merely to placate or reflect their
constituents’ immediate wishes.
Whether discussing the time between elections, the size of the legislature,
or other issues, the key points repeatedly stressed were about structuring
institutions to allow and encourage members to deliberate about the longerterm public interest. Indeed, it could be argued that fostering deliberation
was the single most important goal for a Madisonian Congress.14 At the same
time, however, the Federalists knew they were building an inherent tension
into the process. Deliberation may be the goal for the institution as a whole,
but the fates of the individual members were to rest on the people who put
them in office. Stretching the length of a term was not likely by itself to
produce the kind of legislature they wanted. The answer was not to berate
politicians for looking out for themselves. Rather, it meant assuring there
would be counter-incentives to support those who would look beyond the
12

13
14

See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 (James Madison), 36 (Alexander Hamilton), and 60 (Alexander
Hamilton). See also Martin Diamond, The Federalist, 1787-1788, in AS FAR AS REPUBLICAN
PRINCIPLES WILL ADMIT: ESSAYS BY MARTIN DIAMOND 55-56 (W. Schambra ed., 1992).
Originally published in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey eds., 1963).
THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison).
JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 6-7 (1994).
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electoral imperative or personal greed to pursue longer-term national
interests.
This was a lot to be balanced, and not every institution was likely to get
the balance right for all time. For example, several of the 1787 mechanisms
to promote collective deliberation involved bringing representatives together,
away from their constituents, with enough time between elections to foster
talking and thinking. The idea was to foster a national perspective to counter
local ones. But this was before social media, before year-round legislative
sessions, before there was a full-time lobbying industry based in the capital,
and before nationalized campaign contributions coupled with lobbying
encouraged members to rely on forces outside their constituencies to help
them stay in office. In today’s world, therefore, creating an institution that
promotes deliberation will be more complicated than giving the members
more time in the capital. In light of the nationalizing pressures members now
feel, one could at least entertain the thought that a new balance between
national and local forces might help the institution perform its intended role.
We should acknowledge that this is the part of the argument historians
will see as deviating most clearly from Madison’s prescriptions. Madison was
a consistent advocate during the Constitutional Convention of giving the
national government the power to veto state laws because he saw state
governments as more threatening to rights in a properly constituted multifactional republic. Two responses are in order. First, this article will not be
weighing the relative power of national and state governments but the effects of
nationally and locally generated forces on federal officials. Even with this
caveat, however, we agree that Madison wanted to strengthen the incentives
for federal public officials to separate from the local to develop a national
perspective. We accept the historical point but respond that the balance has
changed over two centuries with sharply different effects on the incentives for
deliberation. The point of this article is not to claim that Federalist means
would be sufficient in today’s world to achieve the Federalists’ ends. The point
is to focus on the importance of their concerns as well as their reasoning
about how institutions can help shape the incentives for accomplishing those
ends.
B. Two Adjustments
Before applying this Madisonian framework to the laws governing
campaign money, one should note two important ways in which the
framework should be adjusted. The first relates to factions. The second
recognizes the role of political parties.
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1. Factions, Inequality, and the Limits of Pluralism15
We have noted that the fundamental political or constitutional reason
offered in Federalist No. 10 for extending the republic’s sphere was to
incorporate a multiplicity of diverse factions. The idea was that diversity
would make it difficult for a cohesive majority to pass laws to oppress a
minority. Of course, history shows that “difficult” is not “impossible,” but
let us take the claim at face value. It is essentially about what Congress likely
would not do. If an organized faction tries to push its agenda, it should not
be able to accomplish its goals without tempering its demands and enlisting
others to its support. But does this negative claim, even if true, mean that
Congress will “be dependent upon the people alone”16 and feel a “diffusive
sympathy with the whole society”17?
In Federalist No. 35, Hamilton defended against the charge that the new
republic would be ruled by the rich who would use government to serve their
interests at the expense of the public. He argued that even though the
Congress would probably be “composed of land-holders, merchants, and
15

16
17

This article uses the word “pluralism” to describe the multiplicity of factions encouraged by
Madison and his Federalist colleagues. However, it is not strictly accurate to use the modern word
“pluralism” as a full description of Madison’s thought. The concept of “pluralism” covers too many
theoretical approaches to be described here, but at least some of the leading writers in this genre
have expressed strong skepticism about using such words as the “public interest” or “common
good.” For important examples, see ROBERT F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A
STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES (1908) and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951) (reflecting skepticism about using phrases such
as “common good” and “public interest” in describing Madison’s idea of “pluralism”). In contrast,
as Alan Gibson has noted, Madison was arguing that a multiplicity of factions, with a system of
representation, was meant to free legislators to pursue what Madison specifically described as the
public interest or common good. See Alan Gibson, Impartial Representation and the Extended Republic:
Towards a Comprehensive and Balanced Reading of the Tenth Federalist Paper, 12 HIST. POL. THOUGHT
(1991); and Alan Gibson, Madison’s Republican Remedy: The Tenth Federalist and the Creation of an
Impartial Republic, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 263-301 (C. Shanahan &
J. Rakove eds., 2020). In the full Madisonian vision, the ideas of “multiplicity of factions” and
“public interest” can be thought of as examples of what some modern writers describe as inputs
and outputs. Separating inputs from outputs makes it easier to understand how Madison could
suggest that “refining and enlarging” might make matters worse as well as better (see supra at note
8). The distinction between inputs (multiplicity of factions) and desired outcomes (the common
good) is important for this article as well. We elide them here under a common label both because
of the influence of the word “pluralism” in modern political writing and because of this article’s
emphasis on the fullness of the factions that participate. That is, our use of the word “pluralism”
emphasizes the “input” side of the equation—where Madison and the modern pluralists share
much. The remainder of this article will claim that addressing what we call the limits of pluralism
(on the “input” side) will also serve the public interest. Therefore, we do not wish to pass over the
distinction silently, even as we use one word in the ensuing analysis.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison).
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men of the learned professions” (such as lawyers), a representative is likely to
act as an “impartial arbiter” when making policy.18 The problem is revealed
by the phrase “impartial arbiter.” The image evoked is of a judge passively
waiting for issues to be presented. But how are issues typically “presented”
for discussion? Sometimes crises force themselves on to the public agenda.
More normally in a modern large republic with a heavy public workload,
and with legislators spending their time in the nation’s capital, it takes an
organization and staff to have the capacity to present one’s demands in a
timely way to overburdened representatives. But building and sustaining an
organization requires money. Most contemporary political scientists,
therefore, see some merit in E. E. Schattschneider’s oft-quoted comment that
“organization is the mobilization of bias.”19 To put the point more strongly,
Schattschneider said that because of the resources needed for effective
organization: “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus
sings with a strong upper-class accent.”20 Extending the sphere may well
make it hard for one faction to dominate, but it does not assure that an
unorganized majority can easily defend itself against a coalition of organized
and well-placed minorities. In other words, it does not mean representatives
automatically will feel dependent upon or responsive to the whole people.
The risk for most of the unorganized is not that they will be tyrannized
overtly but that they will be ignored. One recent book (whose title references
Schattschneider) emphasized this by repeating an old Washington maxim:
“If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”21
It is important to recognize this issue as one that flows in part from
deliberate, structural choices. Gaining political influence in the face of
complexity will depend upon being organized, which in turn (and perhaps
inevitably) means that the unorganized will find it harder to be heard. These
comments are not put forward to reject Madisonian institutionalism but to
expand it. The problem is not self-correcting. The question, therefore, is
how best to address the flaw while also pursuing the Madisonian goal of

18
19

20
21

THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton). Publius made a similar point at THE FEDERALIST
NO. 57 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton).
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 71 (1960); see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 35.
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS:
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 309
(2012).
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deliberation. The perspective of this article is that accepting the benefits of
complexity should go together with an obligation to work toward correction.
2. Political Parties
Many scholars see political parties as the intermediary organizations best
suited to balance these concerns. As is well known, the Constitution’s framers
were suspicious of parties. Despite this, James Madison made a case for them
as early as the Second Congress.22 Nevertheless, we shall skip forward.
Many features of the political party system Martin van Buren developed to
elect Andrew Jackson in 1828 remained salient through the middle of the
twentieth century. At the national level, the parties were essentially weak
federations built up from state and local power bases. They competed
vigorously to win elections partly because winning brought patronage and
jobs. With patronage came kickbacks and other forms of self-dealing. Early
twentieth-century Progressives railed against the system’s corruption, which
some modern writers defend as being as an acceptable cost of doing
business.23 However one evaluates the system, there seems little question that
party workers (with material benefits on the line) expanded the electorate to
bring farmers, immigrants and the urban poor out to the polls. Not everyone
was mobilized, of course. Southern states denied African-Americans the vote
after Reconstruction and the Constitution did not guarantee women the vote
until 1920. On the whole, however, the parties of that era, acting in their
electoral self-interest, brought more voices into the process while facilitating
the government’s ability to reach decisions.
Today’s parties do not much resemble those of a century ago. Whether
one sees the modern parties as service organizations tending to the needs of
their candidates,24 or as coalitions of policy-demanding interest groups,25
there is a consensus among scholars that national party organizations are
22

23

24
25

Joseph Postell, The Rise and Fall of Political Parties in America, 70 FIRST PRINCIPLES 1, 6 (2018),
http://report.heritage.org/fp70 [https://perma.cc/59VU-385P] (citing James Madison,
Consolidation,
NATIONAL
GAZETTE,
December
3,
1791,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0122 [https://perma.cc/YH8CQAPB]). See also JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? A SECOND LOOK 70-101 (2011).
See JONATHAN RAUCH, BROOKINGS INST., POLITICAL REALISM: HOW HACKS, MACHINES, BIG
MONEY, AND BACK‐ROOM DEALS CAN STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 13 (2015)
(ebook) (“I am arguing that machines and machine-like behavior [such as kickbacks] are necessary—
and that governing without them in America is high in friction and low in efficiency . . . .”).
ALDRICH, supra note 22, at 281-87.
Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel & John Zaller, A Theory of
Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571
(2012).
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stronger today while state and local parties have atrophied. The older system
coexisted well with institutions that served deliberative ends. This article will
argue that the strongly nationalized party system of today has been more
problematic.
II. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: A CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM THAT
UNDERMINES DELIBERATION
In attempting to show the utility of a neo-Madisonian framework, this
article will not discuss the dizzying variety of policies reformers have put
forward in the name of serving one or more of the campaign finance goals in
the Appendix. This would be a massive project duplicating previous work.26
Instead, the article will dig more deeply into three clusters that bear directly
on its themes. The first two relate directly to deliberation by members of
Congress: the time members spend fundraising and how members are
appointed to serve on or lead their committees. By implication, both are also
about the distribution of power between committees and party leaders. They
slide directly into our third topic, the role of national political parties.
A. Fundraising Time
Any effort to improve deliberation has to make sure that members have
the time to learn their subject matter and participate meaningfully in
legislative activities. About 60 years ago new members were expected to
attend committee hearings, not ask questions, listen, and learn. Then came
a period when new members would attend and participate, sometimes to the
frustration of senior colleagues. Such participation is less true today because
fundraising steals time directly from attending committee meetings. This was
the subject of a report issued jointly by the organizations R Street and Issue
One, where several of the quotations in the next paragraphs appeared
previously.27

26

27

See John C. Fortier & Michael J. Malbin, An Agenda for Future Research on Money in Politics in the United
States, 11 THE FORUM: J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 384 (2013); NATHANIEL PERSILY,
ROBERT F. BAUER & BENJAMIN L. GINSBERG, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
ASSESSING AN ERA OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE (2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Democracy-Campaign-Finance-in-the-United-States.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TSB9-GQXZ].
Marian Currinder, Michel Beckel & Amisa Ratliff, Why We Left Congress: How the Legislative Branch is
Broken and What We Can Do About It, R STREET 10 (2018), https://www.issueone.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Why-We-Left-Congress-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FS9Q3YH4].

920

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

In 2013, the Huffington Post obtained a slide from an orientation-session
for newly elected members of Congress. The slide described the “Model
Daily Schedule” as including four hours of telephone fundraising every
day—twice what it allowed for legislative business.28 This fundraising is not
to be confused with rubbing shoulders with the rich and famous. It is time
spent in a dreary room near the Capitol in a cubicle next to another cubicle
in which sits another member of Congress. When a reporter asked thenRep. David Jolly (R-FL) how he managed to raise nearly $18,000 per day,
Jolly said he did it:
Simply by calling people, cold-calling a list that fundraisers put in front of
you. You’re presented with their biography. So please call John. He’s
married to Sally. His daughter, Emma, just graduated from high school.
They gave $18,000 last year to different candidates. They can give you
$1,000 too if you ask them to. And they put you on the phone. And it’s a
script . . . . It is a cult-like boiler room on Capitol Hill where sitting members
of Congress, frankly I believe, are compromising the dignity of the office they
hold by sitting in these sweatshop phone booths calling people asking them
for money.29

Jolly was a relatively new member when he gave this interview, but the
practice did not get better for others in later years. That is because members
felt their future power depended on raising money they would then give to
their parties (more on that below). U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) said
he spent four to five hours per day telemarketing during his six years in the
House, describing the practice as “soul-crushing.”30 Former Rep. Steve
Israel (D-NY) estimated that “I’ve spent roughly 4,200 hours in call time,
attended more than 1,600 fund-raisers just for my own campaign and raised
nearly $20 million in increments of $1,000, $2,500 and $5,000 per election
cycle.”31 Nor does it stop when members leave the House for the Senate.
Senators were given six-year terms to have a break between elections. That
may work for four years, but former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle
(D-SD) was quoted as saying that during the final two years of a six-year term
28

29

30

31

Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work
Life, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2013, 7:30 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/call-timecongressional-fundraising_n_2427291 [https://perma.cc/4AE6-2XGB].
Norah O’Donnell, Are Members of Congress Becoming Telemarketers?, 60 MINUTES, CBS NEWS (Apr. 24,
2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-are-members-of-congress-becomingtelemarketers/ [https://perma.cc/7B6Z-GDRQ].
Paul Blumenthal, Chris Murphy: ‘Soul-Crushing’ Fundraising Is Bad for Congress, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 7, 2013, 5:40 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/chris-murphy-fundraising_n_3232143
[https://perma.cc/C3L8-QR8S].
Steve
Israel,
Confessions
of
a
Congressman,
N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
8,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/opinion/steve-israel-confessions-of-a-congressman.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8SG-UGTK].
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Senators were spending two-thirds of their time raising money.32 No wonder
one article quoted retired House member Zach Wamp (R-TN) as saying: “I
don’t know of a single member that is leaving that does not include the
pressures of raising money to advance and maintain your committee position
as one of the contributing factors . . . . They all talk about it. It wears you
out.”33
Solutions to this problem seem as if they should be easy to imagine, even
if not so easy to enact. More than a dozen states prohibit legislators from
raising money while the legislature is in session, with more prohibiting
contributions from lobbyists.34 Of course, it is easier to forbid fundraising
during a session if a legislature meets for only a limited time. Congress is
more like a year-round legislature. Besides, forbidding all fundraising would
reach further than the member’s time. It would also prohibit campaign staff
from arranging events attended by lobbyists and PAC managers. With PACs
making up about 40% of incumbents’ money, this would be a difficult pill for
many members to swallow.
Another approach was put forward by election lawyer Jerry Goldfeder:
instead of prohibiting all fundraising during legislative sessions, simply forbid
officeholders from soliciting contributions personally whether in or out of
legislative session.35 This is similar to an idea put forward in 2016 by Rep.
Jolly and co-sponsors in the so-called “Stop” Act.36 The Jolly bill would have
allowed solicitations by campaign staff or through other fundraising methods
but would not have prevented challengers and open-seat candidates from
fundraising.37 The bill would have reshaped how members use their time,
but incumbents might worry that it would put their campaigns at a
disadvantage. Rep. Richard Nolan (D-MN) introduced a bill the following
32

33

34

35

36
37

Shane Goldmacher, Former Senate Leader Says Senators Spent Two-Thirds of Time Asking for Money, NAT’L
JOURNAL (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/63463/former-senate-leader-sayssenators-spent-two-thirds-time-asking-money [https://perma.cc/864M-WYY4].
Kate Ackley, House Committee Leadership Is Becoming a Game of Musical Chairs, ROLL CALL (Mar. 13,
2018),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/house-committee-leadership-becoming-gamemusical-chairs [https://perma.cc/63L5-KL3P], see also supra note 27 (reflecting the same quote of
Congressman Wamp).
PRATEEK REDDY, STATE-BY-STATE PROHIBITIONS ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO
LEGISLATIVE
CANDIDATES
FROM
LOBBYISTS,
PUBLIC
CITIZEN
(2011),
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/state-lobbyists-contribution-restrictions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7CB-VC45].
See Jerry H. Goldfeder, Ban Candidates from Soliciting Campaign Dough, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 14, 2017, 2:45
PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2017/11/14/bancandidates-from-soliciting-campaign-dough/ [https://perma.cc/P5GH-ASFW].
Stop Act, H.R. 4443, 114th Cong. (2016).
Id.
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Congress that might have addressed the incumbents’ concern by going
further in some respects and less far in others. Nolan would have prohibited
both direct and indirect solicitations by all congressional candidates and their
campaign staffs, but only on days when Congress was in session.38 This
would have reached non-incumbents as well as incumbents even though the
ostensible concern is with how incumbents spend time in office. The
problem with the Nolan bill thus is the opposite of Jolly’s: it would tilt the
balance toward the incumbents by restricting the challengers who typically
are much less well known and therefore need more time to get their
campaigns off the ground. A more straightforward approach might be to
combine the erstwhile Jolly and Nolan bills by only prohibiting office-holders
(and not their staffs) from making solicitations, and only on days Congress is
in session.
B. Committee Assignments and Leadership
Any discussion of fundraising time quickly leads to the distribution of
power within Congress. Since the early nineteenth century, members of
Congress have realized they needed something more than a party system to
do its job properly. They also needed a system of permanent standing
committees to permit members to develop the expertise to process the full
body’s workload. Two very different views have been commonly articulated
about the role committees should play within the chamber. Under one, the
committees’ job is simply to develop and report policies the majority party
wants to enact.39 Under the other, committees may reflect the role of the
majority by their partisan composition, but their main function is to provide
information to the full chamber.40 This, in turn, results in the members
developing independent expertise which at least sometimes is put to work
across party lines.
These two views conflict in some respects but share a key feature. Under
both views, committee leaders would be chosen because of a chair’s ability
to help a committee make policy. As a historical counterpoint, neither theory
could justify choosing leaders automatically because of their seniority. While
developing expertise and judgment takes time, the most senior person is not
necessarily the most skilled. The seniority custom developed as members’

38
39
40

Go to Washington, Go to Work Act, H.R. 6433, 115th Cong. (2018).
See generally GARY W. COX & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993).
See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).
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careers in the House lengthened.41 It served as a practical alternative to
having committees controlled arbitrarily by the majority’s party leaders, and
reflected the realities of institutionalized political power, but could not be
explained under a coherent view of the role of committees as policy-making
bodies.
A similar point could be made today when fundraising is used as an
important criterion for appointing members to committees and selecting
committee chairs. The criterion has nothing to do with the actual job of
chairing a committee. Some background helps explain how the practice
developed. Through the late 1980s, the leaders would mostly be ignored if
they pleaded with members to contribute to their parties’ congressional
campaign committees or support non-incumbents in close races. In 1990,
House Republicans contributed a total of about $300,000 to the National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). Democratic giving to the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) was only a
rounding error above zero.42 Two developments caused this to change
during the 1990s. First, the Republicans’ winning majority control in the
election of 1994 for the first time in 42 years made it clear to every member
that the majority could flip and he or she had a substantial personal stake in
the outcome. Second, both parties—but especially the Republicans—
centralized the power to name committee members and chairs in the hands
of the top party leaders. The leaders quickly began to use the members’
financial contributions to the parties as measures of whether the applicant
would be part of “the team.” By the late-1990s, being a part of the team
meant contributing money to win majorities and deferring to the party on
policy. Legislating was secondary.43
In recent Congresses, the system has reached a level dwarfing the early
2000s. Both parties instituted “dues” systems—specific amounts that
members were expected to contribute if they wanted to serve on various
committees.44 Certain committees are considered “A-Level” or top
41
42

43

44

Nelson W. Polsby, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
144, 150 (1968).
Anne H. Bedlington & Michael J. Malbin, The Party as an Extended Network: Members Giving to Each
Other and to Their Parties, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT MEETS POLITICS 121, 134 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003).
See generally MARIAN CURRINDER, MONEY IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGN FUNDS AND
CONGRESSIONAL PARTY POLITICS (2009); see also ERIC S. HEBERLIG & BRUCE A. LARSON,
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES, INSTITUTIONAL AMBITION, AND THE FINANCING OF MAJORITY
CONTROL (2012) (discussing how Members of Congress have placed increasing emphasis on
fundraising and majority control at the expense of legislating).
See HEBERLIG & LARSON, CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES, supra note 43, at 11.
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committees. These have broad jurisdictions that presumably help their
members raise money from lobbyists and others with business before the
committee. Dues are lower for members of the other committees. On all
committees, the chairs and ranking minority members give more. There is
nothing subtle about this. According to Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY), “They
told us right off the bat as soon as we get here, ‘These committees all have
prices and don’t pick an expensive one if you can’t make the payments.’”45
Rep. Jolly (R-FL) said that his two-year dues were $200,000 for the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and $400,000 for
Appropriations.46 Others put the figures higher for getting and staying on a
committee, and still higher for becoming chair. A 2017 book by Rep. Ken
Buck (R-CO) revealed the price for committee chairs as being $875,000 for
a B committee and $1.2 million for an A Committee.47 For perspective, safe
incumbents in 2018 spent an average of about $2 million during the election
cycle and these large transfers to the parties were part of the $2 million.48
Most of the top dues payers (committee chairs on prestige committees) are in
safe seats.
We need to be clear about how this money is being raised. These are the
members sitting in call booths and attending lunch-time fundraising events
while Congress is in session. During those sessions, they are directly seeking
contributions of up to $2,900 per election (the contribution limit for 20212022) from lobbyists and other access-seekers who have business before their

45

46

47
48

Deirdre Shesgreen & Christopher Schnaars, Local Lawmaker: Congressional Committees ‘All Have Prices’,
USA
TODAY
(May
25,
2016,
1:39
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/25/lawmakers-dues-party-extortionteam-effort/84500168/ [https://perma.cc/D633-2RP3].
MICHAEL BECKEL & MEREDITH MCGEHEE, ISSUE ONE, THE PRICE OF POWER 10 (2017),
https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/price-of-power-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z76M-Q93E]. The report has been updated twice: Michael Beckel & Amisa
Ratliff, The Continuing Price of Power, ISSUE ONE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.issueone.org/thecontinuing-price-of-power-how-the-political-parties-leaned-on-legislative-leaders-for-cash-duringthe-115th-congress/ [https://perma.cc/L69Q-75C4]; Amisa Ratliff, New Congress, Same “Committee
Tax,” ISSUE ONE (Mar. 11, 2121), https://www.issueone.org/new-congress-same-committee-taxhow-the-parties-pressured-legislative-leaders-to-raise-huge-sums-of-campaign-cash-during-the116th-congress-and-are-poised-to-do-so-again/ [https://perma.cc/9C3T-DLLW].
KEN BUCK, DRAIN THE SWAMP: HOW WASHINGTON CORRUPTION IS WORSE THAN YOU
THINK 38 (2017); see also BECKEL & MCGEHEE, THE PRICE OF POWER, supra note 46, at 10-11.
MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, CFI’S GUIDE TO
MONEY IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS—ESSAYS AND TABLES COVERING THE ELECTIONS OF 19742018
11
(2020),
available
at
http://cfinst.org/pdf/federal/2018Report/CFIGuide_MoneyinFederalElections_2018upd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3CF-9FZD].
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committees.49 The transactional nature of the relationship is clear on both
ends, even if only implied. To be sure, there are some positive side benefits
for challengers and open-seat candidates that come from this transfer
process. In most recent elections, corporate and trade association PACs gave
more than 90% of their money to incumbents.50 Their goal is to gain access
for lobbying. In contrast, the party committees support challengers and
open-seat candidates in competitive races. As congressional elections scholar
Gary Jacobson has written, sending what started as PAC money from the
incumbents’ campaign committees to the parties, results in a major
“redistribution” that helps non-incumbent candidates who would not have
gotten support from the original donors.51
However, it is premature to say, as Jacobson does, that “laundering
donations through the parties may diffuse and soften whatever effect
interested contributions have on individual members.” Jacobson qualifies his
statement by saying “we don’t really know because the research has not been
done.”52 This author thinks the point probably is wrong. The system is not
one that merely launders contributions passively. Members are pressured by
the party leaders to raise the money in exchange for preserving or enhancing
the members’ power in the institution. The relationship between donor and
recipient occurs before the money is transferred or laundered. Both the
chairperson who sets the committee’s agenda and the party leaders who set
agendas for the full chambers are engaged in these relationships, which in
turn affect what is placed on the docket for Congress to decide. If the same
contributions and transfers were to occur without pressure from the leaders,
then the laundering argument might hold. But that would not be likely. It
belies the members’ complaints that the dues structure causes them to spend
more of their time fundraising.
Several proposals have been put forward to respond to these practices.
All, except the first, come from the Issue One report cited earlier.53
• A member’s ability to transfer an unlimited amount from a
campaign committee to a party committee rests on a clause in
49

50
51
52
53

Contribution Limits for 2021-2022 Federal Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contributionlimits/ [https://perma.cc/8G27-C7CD] (last visited May 1, 2021).
See MALBIN & GLAVIN, CFI’S GUIDE, supra note 48, at 64, 67.
Gary C. Jacobson, A Collective Dilemma Resolved: The Distribution of Party Campaign Resources in the 2006
and 2008 Congressional Elections, 9 ELECTION L. J. 381, 386-87 (2010).
Id. at 397.
See BECKEL & MCGEHEE, THE PRICE OF POWER, supra note 46, at 18 (proposing potential solutions
to the issue of member dues and fundraising connections to committees).
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the current law that specifically exempts such transfers from
contribution limits. It would be easy technically (although not
politically) to take these few words out of the law. However, this
probably would not accomplish enough. In some states that do
not allow transfers, the leaders pressure the members to raise
money for the party committees directly.54
• Party rules could be changed to make “it clear that party leaders
and steering committees cannot take party dues into account
when determining whom to recommend for committee chairs.”55
However, that strikes this observer as a rule or norm that cannot
be enforced. It feels a bit like the situation in a courtroom when
a jury is told to ignore something a witness said.
• The most promising approach probably would be to let
committee members choose their chairs. The party’s influence
over committees would still be substantial because the parties
ultimately control who is appointed to each committee.
Therefore, one would want to see this coupled with safeguards so
leaders would not stack committees just before each chair is
elected. This selection method would have the major advantage
of decoupling a member’s fundraising from selecting committee
chairs. It should also help increase the independent role of
committees in the legislative process.
These proposals for strengthening committees, like the previous ones for
fundraising during session, may not reduce the amount of money in politics.
That is not their point. They are targeted at preserving the members’ time
for legislation, and at improving the work-units best designed for that effort.
If adopted, some of them could well have a positive impact. However, none
of them gets at the more basic issue.
C. The Role of Political Parties Today
Fundraising time and committee selection are symptoms of something
larger. They are about the role of political parties in Congress and elections.
Some think parties should be treated in campaign finance law as if they were
little more than interest groups or factions. The Federal Election Campaign

54

55

See LYNDA W. POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE
LEGISLATURES: THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS 62-63 (2012) (proposing a model
for analyzing how much time legislators will spend fundraising for themselves and the party).
See BECKEL & MCGEHEE, THE PRICE OF POWER, supra note 46, at 18.
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Act (“FECA”) essentially took this perspective, giving contribution limits to
parties that were similar to those of an interest group.56 Despite this legal
slight, it would be a mistake to think of FECA as having harmed a previously
strong party system. At the time the post-Watergate reforms became law in
1974, the congressional campaign committees were described in one
scholarly book as being “largely invisible.”57 At about this same time, state
and local parties could also be described fairly as being at a “low point,”
voters were disaffected and identifying as independents, and the parties were
reforming the presidential nomination process to take power away from
insiders.58 Despite these conditions, party professionals in the 1970s learned
how to use FECA to turn the national party organizations into being major
players in federal elections.59
56

57
58

59

The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 treated the national political party
committees as political committees, with the same $5,000 per election limit on contributions to
candidates as any other multicandidate political committee (or PAC). The law did make one
important exception for national party committees, permitting the national parties to spend specific,
limited amounts in coordination with the candidates. The coordinated spending limits were
$10,000 per House candidate and varied by state for Senate candidates. See Pub. Law 93-443, §
101(f)(2)-(3), 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 301016(d)). These limits increased
with inflation; contribution limits did not. See Pub. L. 93-443, § 101(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 31016(a)). Other provisions of the law benefitting parties have changed in
the decades since this law passed, but these have not.
Robin Kolodny, Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics
127 (1988).
For a textbook account that describes state and local party organizations as being at a low point
during the period from mid-century to the late-1970s, see SETH MASKET AND HANS NOEL,
POLITICAL PARTIES 168 (2021). For the growth in self-identified independents into the 1970s, see
AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, Party Identification on a 7-Point Scale, 1952-2016,
https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide/top-tables/?id=21 [https://perma.cc/5S2Q5Z22] (last visited Apr. 30, 2021). For presidential nomination reform, see generally BYRON E.
SHAFER, QUIET REVOLUTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE
SHAPING OF POST-REFORM POLITICS (1983). For broad assessments of the depressed state of the
party system at the time, see generally DAVID BRODER, THE PARTY’S OVER: THE FUTURE OF
POLITICS IN AMERICA (1972); and MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952-1988 (1990).
This point connecting party organizational development with FECA was made in a 1975 interview
with the author by Eddie Mahe, Jr., then the Executive Director of the Republican National
Committee. Michael J. Malbin, Republicans Prepare Plan to Rebuild Party for 1976, NAT’L JOURNAL
324, 331 (Mar. 1, 1975). In the same article, the party’s political director linked FECA with a
strategy for turning the national party into “a service organization.” Id. This was during the period
John Aldrich later described as “the rise of the party in service to its candidates.” See ALDRICH,
supra note 22, at 281-87. The professionalization of the national parties is well described elsewhere;
see Paul S. Herrnson, National Party Decision Making, Strategies, and Resource Distributions in Congressional
Elections, 42(3) WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 301 (1989) and Paul S. Herrnson & David
Menefee-Libey, The Dynamics of Party Organizational Development, 11 AM. REV. OF POL. (MIDSOUTH
POL. SCI. J.) 3 (Winter 1990). Also see generally Xandra Kayden, The Nationalizing of the Party System, in
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This growth in the importance of national party committees preceded
“soft money.” Soft money is a term that refers to the funds that parties were
able to raise outside the law’s contribution limits because they were set aside
for activities that technically were not deemed to be federal election activities.
While the practice had its start in the late 1970s, it accelerated in the late
1980s and then became all-but-indistinguishable from election spending in
the 1990s. As a result, soft money receipts “rose from $86 million in 1992 to
about $260 million in 1996 to more than $495 million in 2000.”60 Much of
this came from the treasuries of corporations or labor unions in amounts of
$100,000 or more.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200261 (BCRA, better known
as McCain-Feingold after its principal sponsors in the U.S. Senate) required
the national parties to raise all of their funds within “hard money”
contribution limits. BCRA also required state parties to use hard money
governed by federal contribution limits to pay for anything the law included
within a new definition of “federal election activities.” This included voter
registration and voter mobilization during even-numbered election years.
The law also prohibited corporations and labor unions from using treasury
money to pay for “electioneering” spending, although they could use hard
money raised by their corporate and labor PACs for these expenditures.62
Differing views about BCRA divided political party scholars into roughly
two groups, with the divisions persisting. Unlike those who would treat the
parties as interest groups, both of these camps agree that a properly
functioning political party system is crucial to modern democracies. But the
disagreements have strong policy implications. The following bullet points
broadly characterize the perspectives of those who would emphasize
strengthening the national parties. While not all of the authors make all of
these points, there is a strong overlap. The authors include Bruce Cain,
Samuel Issacharoff, Raymond La Raja and Brian Schaffner, Nathaniel

60

61
62

PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1980), at
257-82; XANDRA KAYDEN & EDDIE MAHE, JR., THE PARTY GOES ON: THE PERSISTENCE OF
THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1985).
Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 33 (Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz &
Trevor Potter eds., 2005); see also Anthony Corrado, Party Finances, Id., at 161.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended 2
U.S.C. 431).
Id.
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Persily, Richard Pildes, and Jonathan Rauch.63 Among the key claims are
the following:
• Imposing contribution limits on the parties did not drive
unlimited money out of the system. Because of the “hydraulics”
of campaign finance (a term introduced by Issacharoff and
Karlan in 1999),64 donors prevented from giving one way simply
found other ways to influence the outcome of elections. BCRA’s
party limits therefore harmed the parties while helping less
accountable, non-party actors.
• Even if BCRA did not hurt the parties directly, the floodgates
opened after the Citizens United decision of 2010. Since then, the
parties may not have lost income in absolute dollars, but they
have lost power relative to independent spending groups which
have raised more money from one election to the next.65 What
is worse, these non-party groups have tended to favor unyielding
extremism over coalition-building and compromise.
• These scholars would argue that the way to bring more power
back to the parties is to give them more money to counter the
resources now held by ideologically extreme groups. This is most
easily done by sharply increasing or removing the limit on
contributions to the political parties.
• Giving the parties more money in elections will give the party
leaders more power to enforce party discipline inside Congress.
It will help them “whip recalcitrant members into line.”66 The
problem with American parties, writes Pildes, is not that they are
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Bruce E. Cain, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY
(2015); Nathaniel Persily, Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL
POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 123 (N. Persily ed., 2015); Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL (2015); Jonathan
Rauch, POLITICAL REALISM, supra note 23; Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile
Takeover of Our Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 HOUST. L. REV. 845 (2017); Richard H. Pildes,
Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L. J. 804
(2014).
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1705 (1999).
See Diana Dwyre, Everything is Relative: Are Political Parties Playing a Meaningful Campaign Finance Role in
U.S. Federal Elections?, in THE STATE OF THE PARTIES 2018: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 233 (John C. Green, Daniel J. Coffee & David
B. Cohen eds., 2018). Dwyre does not make this set of scholars’ other points.
Persily, supra note 63.
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polarized but that they are fragmented. “[O]ur political parties
are not parliamentary-like enough[.]”67
• With more money, the party leaders will have the leverage to
pressure members from safe districts whose only current electoral
fear is of being challenged by an ideologically extreme candidate
in a primary.
• Disciplined parties led by strong leaders, knowing they will be
judged on their records by the voters, will be more restrained,
more willing to cut deals, more willing to compromise, and more
likely to deliberate. In short, they will reduce polarization and
gridlock.
Political scientists who have challenged these points include Thomas
Mann, Anthony Corrado, Norman Ornstein, and the author of this article.
They question both the first perspective’s empirical claims and its policy
prescriptions. With respect to the empirical claims, they have made the
following points: 68
• Any limits placed on contributions and spending clearly will
produce some “hydraulic” effects, but we should not expect
redirection to occur equally for all donors.
Business
corporations, for the most part, have not redirected their preBCRA treasury money from parties to independent spending.
That is because the soft money contributions were hardly
spontaneous. They came after the business lobbyists were asked
to contribute by the party leaders or staffs. The businesses gave
to preserve access. They have been perfectly happy since then
not to be pressured to give.
67
68

Pildes, supra note 63, at 809.
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48-53
(2010),
http://www.cfinst.org/books_reports/Reform-in-an-Age-of-Networked-Campaigns.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MC4M-RKD3]; MICHAEL J. MALBIN & CHARLES R. HUNT, PARTY
CONTRIBUTION
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(2017),
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/papers/PartyContributionLimits_Polarization.pdf [https://perma.cc/77J9JKA7]; THOMAS E. MANN & ANTHONY CORRADO, PARTY POLARIZATION AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Mann-and-Corrad_PartyPolarization-and-Campaign-Finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UPP-FDYG]; THOMAS E. MANN & E.J.
DIONNE, JR., THE FUTILITY OF NOSTALGIA AND THE ROMANTICISM OF THE NEW POLITICAL
REALISTS: WHY PRAISING THE 19TH-CENTURY POLITICAL MACHINE WON’T SOLVE THE 21ST
CENTURY’S
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(2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/new_political_realists_mann _dionne.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF6YCH9J].
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•

After BCRA, the party committees quickly made up for soft
money and then some. This was supplemented after Citizens
United by independent spending committees associated with the
congressional party leaders, as discussed below.
• Most of the increase in non-party independent expenditures (IEs)
has not come from people who were giving at the same rate to
the party before BCRA. Much is new money or money from
donors who upped their giving substantially. These typically are
individual donors who are highly motivated for ideological, issuebased, or partisan reasons.
• Ideological and issue organizations (and at least some of their
donors) have an incentive to preserve their identities and not
submerge their agendas into the parties’. Recent research on the
states shows that the amount these entities put into independent
expenditures is not influenced by the presence or absence of
contribution limits to parties. Their donors have not and would
not be likely to redirect their money away from IEs to give to the
parties.69
However, the main point of this article is not to litigate the empirical
claims. Advocates and reform organizations who have opposed the idea of
removing contribution limits for the political parties usually have done so in
the name of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. The
scholars who advocate strengthening the national parties object that
excessive concern about corruption is harming the key institutions needed to
make legislatures work well. These party scholars deserve recognition for
asking campaign finance reformers to face up to the institutional
consequences of their policies. The paragraphs to follow in this article do the
same to the party “realists.” This is a conversation taking place on
appropriately Madisonian terms.
Let us assume that party contribution limits were removed, giving the
national party leaders control over more money. How should we expect
them to use their new resources? It seems highly unlikely that they would use
campaign funds to pressure a member to follow the party’s line on legislative
issues. In a closely divided Congress, every seat is important to a majority.
Withholding campaign funds, therefore, is not an effective means for
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Charles R. Hunt, Jaclyn J. Kettler, Michael J. Malbin, Brendan Glavin & Keith E. Hamm, Assessing
Group Incentives, Independent Spending, and Campaign Finance Law by Comparing the States, 19 ELECTION L.
J. 374, 385 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2019.0570 [https://perma.cc/H4AR-3DPT].
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influencing how a member behaves inside Congress. Control over the
institution’s internal sources of power, from committee leadership to agendasetting, seems more useful for rewarding and punishing members inside the
institution. But the current leaders already have these powers. Our question
is, what would they do with more of it? Would Congress be more
deliberative? Would it produce better long-term policy outcomes as a result?
There is good reason to be skeptical.
In her book Insecure Majorities, Frances Lee connects polarization in recent
Congresses to the historically rare but recently persistent fact that the
chambers are controlled by only narrow majorities, subject to reversal in
almost any given election.70 This helps give party leaders an incentive to
promote what she described (in an earlier book) as cleavage issues: “Cleavage
issues enable parties to present a clear alternative to their opponents.
Democrats and Republicans have a vested interest in preserving established
conflicts.” Agendas are “biased in favor of particular types of issues and
against others, compared with the agendas that would emerge in bipartisan
committees or committees of the whole.”71 These agendas preserve unity
within the parties while dividing the parties from each other. They are
signaled by persistent and repetitive “message voting” through which the
leaders are more interested in developing a message to use in the next
election than in sharing the credit to make public policy.72 Gary Jacobson
offered a parallel assessment: “Strong party leadership contributes to
collective accountability, but it also sharpens partisan acrimony in the House
and Senate, with problematic consequences for a bicameral legislature in
which a cohesive minority in one chamber usually wields an effective
veto[.]”73 We see no reason, therefore, to assume that handing more power
to the leaders will make the leaders more likely to encourage committees to
deliberate, or make the leaders less likely to spend their time on message
voting.
Finally, we do not have to guess about the institutional effects of doing
away with contribution limits for the parties. The country has now gone
through three federal election cycles in which the parties have operated in
effect without contribution limits. This occurred in several steps beginning
in 2014. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 and the Bipartisan

70
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FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN (2016).
FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S.
SENATE 164 (2009).
LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES, supra note 70, at 201.
Jacobson, A Collective Dilemma Resolved, supra note 51, at 397.
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Campaign Reform Act of 2002 placed limits on how much a donor could
give to candidates or political committees. As of March 2014, individuals
could give no more than $32,400 per year to a major national political party
committee and another $10,000 (unindexed) to a state or local party. More
significantly for the parties, the law also said individuals could give no more
than a combined two-year total of $123,200 to all candidates, parties, and
PACs combined, no more than $74,600 of which could go to parties.
On April 2, 2014, the Supreme Court struck down aggregate
contribution limits in the case of McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.74
After McCutcheon, an individual was free to give the maximum legal
contribution to as many candidates, political party committees, and PACs as
the donor wished.75 After a few more months, contributions were allowed to
go even higher because of a provision tucked into the federal budget at the
end of 2014.76 Combining McCutcheon with the provisions in the budget bill
had the effect of permitting a donor to give Democratic or Republican parties
up to a combined two-year total of $2.6 million. This was 35 times the
$74,600 aggregate limit before McCutcheon.77
But the hard money contribution limits are only part of the story. After
Citizens United, close associates of the four congressional party leaders formed
Super PACs and nonprofit advocacy organizations to collect unlimited
contributions and make unlimited independent expenditures (IEs) to support
their parties’ candidates. Everyone in politics understands these to be arms
of the congressional leaders. In 2014 they made $128 million in IEs on
House and Senate elections. By 2020 their IEs were up to $889 million. This

74
75

76

77

572 U.S. 185 (2014).
This would mean parties and presidential candidates could ask for a single contribution to a joint
fundraising committee that could include $32,400 per year (indexed to $33,900 for 2017-18 and
$35,500 for 2019-20) for each the national party committees and $10,000 (unindexed) for each of
the fifty state party committees. These party limits are all annual limits, doubled for the two-year
cycle. Thus, the combined post-McCutcheon total for 2015-16 theoretically was $597,200 per year,
or $1,194,400 for a two year election cycle. Indexed for 2019-20 this would be $1,213,000 for all
Democratic or Republican parties combined.
P.L. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772. The law was known awkwardly as “CRomnibus” because it
combined a continuing appropriations resolution or CR with an omnibus budget reconciliation
package. It let each of the six national party committees set up two special accounts for legal fees
and building funds plus one additional account each for the national committees for the national
party conventions. Thus, individuals could give $100,200 per year in 2016 (indexed) to seven
Democratic or Republican accounts, for a combined annual maximum of $701,400 (or $1.4 million
for two years) for the special accounts alone. Adding this to the numbers in the previous footnote
gives a grand total of $2,597,200.
The preceding two paragraphs appeared first in MALBIN & GLAVIN, CFI’S GUIDE, supra note 48,
at 18-19.
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was in addition to $370 million in IEs by the four formal congressional party
committees. Together this meant the formal party committees and related
leadership committees spent nearly half again as much on IEs in 2020 as all
of the non-party ideological and issue spenders combined.78 This should not
surprise us. In light of the Federal Electoral Commission’s weak enforcement
of any restraints on “coordination” between the committees and leaders, the
“hydraulic theory” should lead us to expect leakage.
This is not simply a transfer of old money. In the 2018 election cycle, the
four major congressional party leadership Super PACs raised 93% of their
$544 million from donors who gave $100,000 or more, 75% from donors
who gave $1 million or more. The million-dollar donors were not in the
system at remotely this level before either BCRA or Citizens United. This is a
development that exacerbates the system’s inequalities whatever it might be
doing for (or to) the parties.79
It is worth revisiting the original argument in light of this finding. We
were told that if parties could raise and spend unlimited amounts, this would
counter external group spending, increase the power of the party leaders,
promote bargaining and compromise, and thereby reduce polarization in the
system. Obviously, polarization did not decline after this change during the
presidency of Donald Trump. If it does decline under a different President,
it will not be because national parties raise more from large donors. We
therefore should ask why the original argument did not bear out.
Among congressional scholars, there is broad level of support for one or
another form of the Conditional Party Government theory (CPG), which was
first articulated in 1991.80 In this theory, the leaders are agents of the
members, who are the principals. The leaders can pressure members only
as much as the members collectively are willing to accept. The members’
willingness to delegate, in turn, rests on their electoral interests (as individuals
and as teams) as well as their policy goals. One of the bigger electoral fears
78

79
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See Michael J. Malbin & Brendan Glavin, CFI: Independent Spending in 2020 Equaled the Candidates’ in
Close Races, and Parties Dominated the IEs, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN POL.,
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/2020/PostElec/Table14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VUM58AV3] (last visited Mar. 18, 2021) (adjusting comparative values for inflation); MALBIN & GLAVIN,
CFI’S GUIDE, supra note 48, at 83 (containing the numbers used in this paragraph of the article
text).
See Michael J. Malbin & Brendan Glavin, Million-Dollar Donors Fuel Congressional Leadership Super PACs,
Along with “Dark Money” and “Grey Money,” NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN POL. (Aug. 8, 2020),
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/cfi-million-dollar-donors-fuelcongressional-leadership-super-p [https://perma.cc/9L3Z-XPX6] (discussing the role of milliondollar donors in the 2020 election cycle).
DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE, 31-34 (1991).
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incumbents have expressed in recent years has not been about home-grown
opposition. The fear is about national organizations bankrolling their
opponents, or nationally-funded IEs parachuting into their districts at the last
minute when they have little time to react. In the current campaign finance
environment, these members have to stockpile extra money in their
campaign committees “just in case,” or they must depend on their parties’
IEs to counter the ones helping their opponents. That is, they rely on
national parties to counter the national forces they fear might come against
them. They put up with a system that has them spending hours doing “call
time” to turn “party dues” money over to the congressional campaign
committees as an insurance policy for themselves or their vulnerable
colleagues against potential IEs from the other side’s national parties and
interest group allies.
One interesting book on the nationalization of politics is Daniel Hopkins’
The Increasingly United States.81 Hopkins offers compelling documentation of
how state and local politics have come to be influenced (if not dominated) by
nationalizing forces and interests. This has had profound consequences for
the government:
[L]egislators have little incentive to bargain for benefits targeted to their
constituents. Rather than asking, “How will this particular bill affect my
district?” legislators in a nationalized polity come to ask, “Is my party for or
against this bill?” That makes coalition building more difficult, as legislators
all evaluate proposed legislation through the same partisan lens.82

If the underlying institutional problem stems from the presence of two
nationalized teams fighting for domination, that problem will not be resolved
by giving heavier weapons to national party leaders so they can beat back the
nationalized ideological factions. The presence of two distinct and mostly
unified teams runs counter to promoting a multiplicity of factions. Rather
than serving the deliberative goal Madison sought by emphasizing the
national over the local, it seems today to be having the opposite effect. The
desire to defeat an all-consuming opponent in a one-on-one contest leaves
little room for creative, substantive, or effective deliberation. It is important
81

82

DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY AMERICAN
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED (2018). See also Joel Sievert & Seth C. McKee, Nationalization
in U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial Elections, 47(5) AM. POL. RES. 1055 (2019) (discussing the impact of
increasingly nationalized elections); Joshua N. Zingher & Jesse Richman, Polarization and the
Nationalization of State Legislative Elections, 47(5) AM. POL. RES. 1036 (2019) (discussing the
nationalization and polarization of political parties); Tom Davis, All Politics Is No Longer Local, in THE
PARTISAN DIVIDE: CONGRESS IN CRISIS 95-146 (2014) (offering a former member of Congress’s
interesting take on the subject).
HOPKINS, supra note 81, at 7.
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to emphasize that this is not a criticism of party organizations per se. It is a
criticism against relying on national parties and their leaders in the expectation
that this will change the underlying dynamic. While there can be a case to
be made in favor of strengthening state and local party organizations,83
relying on unlimited contributions to national parties would do little to
weaken polarization, or strengthen deliberation, or address pluralism’s
biases.
III. ADDRESSING THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM IN A MADISONIAN
FRAMEWORK
Earlier, this article described the “mobilization of bias” as a concern
organically connected with a democratic republic’s complexity. In this
author’s view, accepting the benefits of complexity should go together with
helping to ameliorate its costs. Doing do so would call for an effort not only
to extend the sphere, as the Framers did, but to deepen it through
participation.
A. Why Limits Do Not Address the Issue
One way campaign finance reformers have tried to address this concern
is by regulating how much a person can give or spend in politics. This has
run up against major constitutional, definitional, and practical barriers. The
constitutional barriers are best known but only the first. FECA in 1974
imposed mandatory limits on both spending and contributions. The
Supreme Court rejected mandatory limits on candidate spending and IEs in
Buckley v. Valeo (1976).84 It accepted contribution limits, but only in the name
of deterring corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Buckley Court
explicitly rejected the pursuit of equality as a permissible justification for
limits—a position the Court reaffirmed in 2010 and 2014.85
As a response to these judicial decisions, some have urged amending the
Constitution. However, even aside from the long political odds, there is a
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See, e.g., Ian Vandewalker & Daniel I. Weiner, Stronger Parties, Stronger Democracy: Rethinking Reform,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2015); Raymond J. La Raja & Jonathan Rauch, The State of State
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Danial Stid, Could Stronger Parties Be Part of the Solution?, THE ART OF THE ASS’N (July 5, 2020),
https://www.theartofassociation.org/blog/could-stronger-parties-be-part-of-the-solution
[https://perma.cc/Q39T-WCYH].
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 1.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).

December 2021]

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

937

serious question whether an amendment, if adopted, would accomplish this
goal. Even though regulations can have an important role to play in
deterring corruption—including contribution limits, full disclosure for “dark
money,” and enforcing a true independence between spenders and
candidates or parties—the regulation of independent spending and megadonors is not likely to affect the structural conditions behind the phrase
“mobilization of bias.” For one thing, the line between political and issue
speech is too permeable to prevent wealthy and highly motivated financiers
from paying for issue ads and other activities that affect elections.86 More
importantly, the solution would do nothing to bring new players into the
process. There is more to be gained (to borrow another of Schattschneider’s
ideas) by expanding the field. Moreover, this can be done within current
constitutional law.87
Of course, there is a good reason why most candidates and political
organizations rely on donors who write large checks. Raising funds takes
organization, serious seed money, and a precious part of one’s time. As a
result, candidates and others typically go where they think the money will be.
They engage in what Schlozman, Verba, and Brady called “rational
prospecting.”88 They do so, as the bank robber Willie Sutton once said:
“Because that’s where the money is.”89 But what is rational can change if
either the costs or benefits of seeking small contributions change.90
Technology has made it feasible to raise large amounts over the Internet
without the candidate having to invest personal time. ActBlue has developed
a platform that has lowered the transaction costs for Democratic donors and
recipients. WinRed is a new platform whose goal is to accomplish the same
for Republicans. While it has taken time, ActBlue’s success is shown by the
fact that more money to candidates and liberal causes passed across its
platform in 2018 than all of the independent expenditures on both sides of
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[https://perma.cc/E2YX-F8JJ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors: Incentives, Economies of Scale, and Effects, 11(3) THE FORUM: J.
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the aisle combined.91 Technology has lowered the organizational and
financial cost of fundraising; candidates, causes, and donors have responded.
Nevertheless, most congressional candidates still get most of their money
from that small part of the individual and interest group population that can
afford to write checks of $1,000 or more; an overwhelmingly large
percentage of the public continues to give nothing.92
B. Small-Donor Proposals, Critique, and Response
One policy response has been to invest public money into making it more
worthwhile for candidates to reach out to small donors. Two approaches
have gained attention in recent years. New York City has had a matching
fund system in place for more than thirty years, with more generous
matching rates over time. In the most recent citywide elections of 2017, the
city was giving six dollars in public matching funds for each of the first $175
a candidate raised from each donor. (The rates were increased in 2018.)
Research by this author and colleagues has shown clearly that the city’s
system has (1) increased the participating candidates’ reliance on small
donors, (2) increased the number of small donors, and (3) created a more
economically and racially diverse donor pool.93 Other local jurisdictions
have imitated this approach.94
The city of Seattle, Washington, has gone beyond matching with the
world’s first-ever voucher system. This kind of approach has stirred interest
among scholars for some time.95 Under it, Seattle takes the initiative of giving
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See DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 189-201 (1975) (discussing the voucher plan of public
financing); Edward M. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994) (proposing an equal-dollars-per-voter closed system of public
financing); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996) (calling for campaign finance reform through
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each eligible donor four $25-vouchers which potential donors may then give
to the candidate(s) of their choice. (Some of the academic authors would also
allow vouchers to be given to parties or PACs.)96 To keep the program
affordable, there is a budget cap on the number of vouchers that may be
redeemed in an election. Seattle’s initial results seem promising. Studies by
Brian McCabe and Jennifer Heerwig of the program’s first election in 2017
found that voucher users were less likely to have high incomes and more
likely to come from poor neighborhoods than cash donors.97 These results
were similar to New York City’s. In Seattle’s next set of elections, in 2019,
the same authors divided the cash donors and found that while voucher users
were slightly more representative than cash donors who gave more than $25,
they were slightly less so than donors who gave $25 or less.98 While there is
much more to be learned about long-term effects of vouchers, both programs
bring a more diverse set of donors into the system. In other words, they begin
to address one of pluralism’s key flaws.
But that success does not automatically mean the models should be
applied to national elections, without modification. A bill passed by the U.S.
House of Representatives in 2019 would have done that by adopting
matching funds and tax credits, along with an experimental voucher
program, in federal elections.99 However, “scaling up” to the federal level
raises serious questions. From the perspective of this article, the most serious
criticism has been whether multiplying the value of small donors would
promote ideological extremism, further undermining deliberation. The
essence of the argument rests on two claims. The first is that small donors
are themselves ideologically more extreme than large donors. The second is
that small donors favor and help elect candidates who are ideologically more
extreme than their cohorts. These claims have been put forward most
forcefully by Richard Pildes,100 who in turn relies on research to be
referenced below. Concerning donors, there have been three separate lines
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S. 1, 116th Cong. § 5101 (as received by Senate, Mar. 12, 2019).
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of scholarly research the weight of which, I would argue, does not support
there being an ideological difference between individual donors who give
small and large contributions.
• Most scholars who have written about federal donors have not
had access to donors who give a candidate $200 or less because
of federal disclosure rules. As a result, they have unable to talk
about small donors. Michael Barber, for example, found that
individual donors tend to be more ideological than such
organizational donors as PACs or parties, but this applies to all
individual donors and does not speak at all to the ideology of
independent spenders.101 The finding for donors is not
controversial but also not useful for the issue at hand.
• A few studies have been able to compare small and large donors.
Of these:
o The two that raise the fewest methodological questions
find no ideological difference between individuals who
give large and small contributions.102
o One study did find a difference that ran contrary to the
claimed expectations. In a survey-based study of donors
to candidates in state elections, the authors (who included
this author) found small donors on almost all issues and
in their ideological positioning to be less extreme than
large donors, falling somewhere between the large
donors and general public.103 However, one should feel
hesitant about concluding too much from this because
the state-based survey is more than ten years old and
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Michael J. Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures, 78(1)
J. POLS. 296 (2016). Note that the comparison being made is between PAC and individual
contributors. Most PAC contributions come from corporate or trade association PACs, which tend
to seek access to incumbents. However, other prominent, non-individual actors—most importantly
independent spending organizations—are more likely to be issue groups, ideological organizations,
or partisan surrogates.
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, JAY GOODLIFFE & JOSEPH A. OLSEN, WHO DONATES IN CAMPAIGNS? THE
IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE, MESSENGER, MEDIUM, AND STRUCTURE 193-95, 353 (2018);
Zachary Albert & Raymond J. La Raja found that small and large donors “share similar levels of
ideological extremism” in their working paper, Small Dollar Donors and the Evolving Democratic Party
(Jan. 15, 2020) (on file with the American Political Science Association,
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2020-9rnkd [https://perma.cc/Q98M-8PA8]).
Wesley Y. Joe et al., Do Small Donors Improve Representation? Some Answers from Recent Gubernatorial and
State Legislative Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2008), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/booksreports/APSA_2008_SmallDonors.pdf [https://perma.cc/V926-KFYR].
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therefore not likely to reflect small donors in federal
elections today.
• With respect to candidates, one published study found that small
donors gave to more ideologically extreme candidates than large
donors, but that study was based on a quirky definition that
called anyone who gave $1,500 or less a small donor. Even in
this study, there is only a slight visible difference in the general
ideological patterns for donors who gave less than $1,500 and
those donors who were among the country’s top 0.01% in their
income.104
Aside from this study one mostly sees anecdotes. It is certainly fair to
point out that some well-known progressive Democrats and conservative
Republicans received a lot of small-donor money. But so have many others;
the generalization does not hold up when the full list of recipients is
considered. In 2013, this author published the following, based on the
elections of 2012. The analysis was limited to winners to allow one to
consider their subsequent ideological positioning on congressional roll call
votes.
Fifty-two Democratic candidates and 24 Republicans raised $250,000 or
more from small donors in 2012 . . . . [A]lmost exactly half [of the ones
elected] had liberalism (or conservatism) scores above the median for all
members of their own party and the other half fell below their full party’s
midpoint. That is, the top 5% of all incumbents in small-donor receipts (i.e.,
the 28 incumbents above $250,000) were randomly distributed within their
own parties ideologically. The parties may be polarized for many reasons,
but these incumbents were no different in their policy positions from their
large-donor-funded cohorts.105

This admittedly was not a sophisticated multi-variate study with controls
and therefore is not decisive empirically. However, it is better than a few
anecdotes and helps us return to a point that ran through the earlier
discussion of nationalized politics.
104
105

Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality? 27(3) J. ECON. PERSPS. 103, 115
(2013).
Malbin, Small Donors, supra note 90, at 396-97. Ian Vandewalker reached a similar conclusion
in 2021: “Pildes provides a list of nine representatives who raised most of their money from small
donors [in 2020], but the list does not show a correlation between small donors and extremism.
According to DW-NOMINATE, a commonly used metric of ideology that political scientists use
to show how similar legislators’ roll-call voting records are to each other, most of these nine
members are closer to the ideological center than the median member of their party.” Ian
Vandewalker, How to Change the Incentives for Both Politicians and Donors, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Feb.
4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-change-incentivesboth-politicians-and-donors [https://perma.cc/325G-FS6Y].
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One reason small donors seem not to track ideological differences within
the parties is that polarization and partisan animosity are not simply about
ideology or policy. Frances Lee’s work, cited earlier, shows that when the
parties in Congress divide into rigid camps, the specific issues between them
often have little to do with ideology. Inattentive voters, we know from the
work of David Broockman, may have strongly felt policy views without their
issue positions being consistently liberal or conservative.106 At the elite level,
however, the members of Congress and their supportive interest groups
behave more like two national teams battling for control of the
government.107 The teams indeed have different centers of gravity on policy
and those distances have widened. Nevertheless, partisan polarization is not
the same thing as ideological distance. Republican members of Congress
remained distant from the Democrats even when they changed their policy
positioning under President Trump. Members of Congress support strong
party leaders because they want to be part of a winning team. They care
what the team stands for, but they also care about being in the majority so
they can turn what they stand for into policy.
And so it is with many of the individual donors who currently give to
federal candidates, including small donors. We have already noted how
successful ActBlue has been at facilitating contributions for Democratic
candidates and progressive organizations. According to its website,
contributions raised through ActBlue doubled from $335 million in the 2014
election cycle to $782 million in 2016, doubled again to $1.7 billion in 2018,
and then nearly tripled to $4.8 billion in 2020. Most of the 2020 money is
classified by ActBlue as having come from “small donors,” though its
definitions are not clear and may not be comparable to the ones used
elsewhere in this article.108 Importantly for our purposes, ActBlue’s donors
(including small donors) gave to candidates at some distance from where they
live, and many gave to candidates in competitive races at the heart of the
battle for national party control. Unlike the local donors at house parties or
rallies, they may know little about the candidates before their first
contributions other than what they can read on a website, along with the

106
107
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David E. Broockman, Approaches to Studying Policy Representation, 41(1) LEGIS. STUD. Q. 181 (2016).
See LEE, supra notes 70-71.
See Emily Dong & Dave Stern, Q4 2018: Closing a Historic Cycle, ACTBLUE BLOG, (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://blog.actblue.com/2019/01/08/q4-2018-closing-a-historic-cycle/
[https://perma.cc/XBW5-TQWY] (discussing the 2018 election cycle fundraising numbers);
Sarah
Potter,
2020
Election
Cycle
Recap,
ACTBLUE
BLOG,
https://blog.actblue.com/2020/12/03/2020-election-cycle-recap/ [https://perma.cc/A4QCYL7D] (last visited May 3, 2021).
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crucial fact that the candidates are touted as being in competitive races. The
candidates’ messages undoubtedly matter to them, but they were not drawn
to the polar extremes when choosing among the candidates on Team Blue.
The main goal was to win a majority for the team. In 2018, as in past years,
ActBlue’s donors supported moderate Democrats in swing districts just as
they supported progressives in districts safe for their party.
What ActBlue and WinRed do is not so much to underwrite ideological
extremism or purity within the parties. Rather, the platforms are two of the
many powerful forces paving the paths of nationalization in American
politics. To the extent that nationalization equates with polarization, it has
been about the divisions between two teams fueled by intense animosity toward
the opposition109 more than by purely ideological or issue differences among
fellow partisans. This is not a criticism of the contribution platforms. We
part with some critics in that we see much to favor in the technology that
enables small donors. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the separate question
of whether, how much, or under what conditions to multiply these donors’
value with public funds, especially in national elections. Some critics have
questioned using public funds in this way because it is likely to fuel ideological
extremism within the two parties. We disagree with that specific concern but
raise questions about using public funds without a policy correction to be
described below, because without such a correction the funds could help
underwrite a further nationalization of the forces that feed the partisan
rigidity in Congress today. This is a Congress organized by two hostile
parties whose members are willing to give up the time they should use for
legislating to raise party dues that, in turn, will be used to weaken legislative
committees by making dues-paying the basis for assignments and
chairmanships. Those tendencies do not need reinforcement.
One additional and disturbing concern needs to be acknowledged.
Providing matching funds for contributions raised nationally offers a
profiteering opportunity to ruthless vendors. In March 2021, The Washington
Post reported that the Olympic Media company raised millions of dollars for
conservative candidates, keeping much (or most) of the money it generated
for itself or offshoots.110 This was reminiscent of stories written about
109
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Partisan Antipathy: More Intense, More Personal, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.peoplepress.org/2019/10/10/partisan-antipathy-more-intense-more-personal/
[https://perma.cc/4L8X-ZHZS].
Meaghan Flynn & Michael Scherer, Donors Gave a House Candidate More than $8 Million. A Single Firm
Took Nearly Half of It, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/klacik-gop-campaign-donations/2021/03/02/76300fde-7077-11eb-85fae0ccb3660358_story.html [https://perma.cc/F3UN-CH2T].
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conservative fundraiser Richard Viguerie in the 1980s.111 According to
records filed with the Federal Election as of early March 2021, two nearly
unknown candidates (Kim Klacik of Maryland and Lacy Johnson of
Virginia) paid more than $2.8 million each to Olympic Media to raise money
for House campaigns they lost by huge margins in 2020.112 The press
accounts suggest these amounts may be only a part of the company’s real
fees.113 Whatever the final number, this is a business model that relies on the
gullibility of ill-informed national donors many of whom are giving small
contributions. It is not one that federal matching funds should subsidize.
C. Geography as a Counterweight
Concerns about hyper-partisanship and profiteering may call for careful
drafting, but they do not justify turning one’s back on the key issue that lends
support to small-donor matching funds and vouchers. Pluralism still leaves
too many off to the side. So, the question becomes whether one can address
pluralism’s flaws while also countering, or at least not worsening, the forces
that weaken deliberation. One approach would be to put a low enough limit
on the maximum amount of public money a candidate may receive. This
would restrain the most dangerous concerns about matching funds
subsidizing a few extreme outliers. An additional and more promising
method for legislative elections is suggested by a recent New York State law.
On December 1, 2019, the New York State Commission on Public
Campaign Finance Reform recommended a set of proposals that became
law on January 1.114 The law was declared an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority on March 12.115 However, it was quickly reenacted
verbatim by the legislature and signed by the Governor on April 3, 2020.116
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Molly Moore & Tom Sherwood, PACs Balk at Viguerie Mailing Fees, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 1985),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/03/22/pacs-balk-at-viguerie-mailingfees/20c470a5-582e-42f7-95de-b958ea635bda/ [https://perma.cc/RHU7-PMZ3].
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
DISBURSEMENTS
TO
OLYMPIC
MEDIA,
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=olympic+me
dia [https://perma.cc/KE88-K7X3] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
Flynn & Scherer, supra note 110.
N.Y. STATE CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM COMM’N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE (Dec. 1, 2019).
Jastrzemski v. Pub. Campaign Fin. & Election Comm’n, 129 N.Y.S. 3d 628 (2020); Hurley v. Pub.
Campaign Fin. & Election Comm’n, 129 N.Y.S. 3d 243, 261 (2020).
S. 7508B, Legis. Assemb. § 14-200 (N.Y. 2020) (identical to Assem. B. 9508B). For the dates of
significant
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including
passage
and
the
Governor’s
signature,
see
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=S07508&term=2019&Actions=
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While the law’s future may depend in part on an unrelated controversy over
ballot access for minor parties, the provisions for financing state legislative
elections deserve attention. The commission began with a proposal to
replicate New York City’s public financing program, which had provided a
six-to-one matching grant for the first $175 of any contribution from city
residents to participating candidates. (As previously noted, the rates were
increased in 2018 for future elections.) The state commission rejected the
idea of matching the first $250 from donors who gave larger amounts,
deciding to offer matching only for donors who give a candidate no more
than $250 in the aggregate. It retained a six-to-one match for statewide
candidates but made the following departures for legislative candidates.
• First, only contributions from residents of the legislative district
the candidate is running to represent will be matched.
• Second, to make up for the lost money to candidates, the
commission came up with more generous, tiered rates for donors
who give an aggregate of $250 or less.
o The first $50 will be matched at a twelve-to-one rate;
o From $51 to $150 will be matched nine-to-one;
o From $151 through $250 will be matched eight-to-one.
o Thus, an eligible contribution of $250 will be worth
$2,550 of which $2,300 would be public matching
money. (Under the city’s six-to-one match for the first
$175, a $250 contribution was worth $1,300.)
• The system does not impose spending limits but does cap the
amount of public money any one candidate may receive. This is
meant not only to protect the public purse but also to prevent a
candidate from building up an insuperable margin from
matching funds.
• To respond to the concern that it will be hard to raise money in
a poor district, the commission made it easier in districts with
below-average incomes for the candidates to qualify for the
program and start bringing in public funds.
Thus the New York State law is deliberately structured to focus public
money on strengthening the ties between candidates and their small-donor
constituents. It is about making the matching funds into being about something
Y&Text=Y [https://perma.cc/6JYE-3V8N] (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). The appropriate section
of the same 2020-21 Budget Act may also be found in Part ZZZ, ch. 58 of New York State’s Chapter
Laws of 2020.
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more than money. These matching funds can also help the candidates and
their campaign organizations build local networks to withstand potential
attacks from outside. And it is worth noticing how the law attempts to
accomplish this. Previous work critical of contributions from outside of a
district tried to reel them in with limits.117 There is good reason to question
the constitutionality of such an approach.118 More fundamentally, it would
not do the main job that interests us. As with some of the other limits
discussed earlier, geographically-based restrictions would do nothing to bring
new participants to the table. In contrast, the law’s incentives are structured
to help correct the defects of unmoderated pluralism in a way that runs
counter to the nationalizing forces prevalent in American politics.
Because the New York State system has not yet been put into effect, there
is no experience to back up or refute these claims. However, the present
author was also co-author of a report that modeled the likely effects by
creating simulations with methods drawn from previous peer-reviewed work
on New York City and other jurisdictions.119 The scenarios built out from
the following first-level assumptions: (1) the same candidates would run as
had run in the then-most recent state elections (2018), (2) the candidates
would attract the same donors, (3) the donors would give the same amounts,
up to the new contribution limits, and (4) matching funds would be applied,
as appropriate, as if they had been in effect for the old donors.120
The analysis then geo-coded each of the state’s donors and mentally
“awarded” matching money for contributions only if they went to an
Assembly or Senate candidate running to represent the donor’s residential
district. Because the law will only match contributions from donors who give
up to $250 in the aggregate, the scenarios further assumed that donors within
the district who gave between $251 and $2500 would stop at $250. That is
because the matching funds will make a $250 contribution worth as much as
an unmatched contribution of $2,550. Donors who gave between $2,501
117
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119
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See David Fontana, The Geography of Campaign Finance Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1247-1248
(2017) (“Only by making campaign finance law conscious of place can we begin to address the
problems of the geography of campaign finance law.”).
See Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2018) (2-1 decision) (overturning a portion
of an Alaska law that limited how much money a candidate may accept, in the aggregate, from outof-state residents).
See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, SMALL DONOR PUBLIC FINANCE IN NEW YORK
STATE: MAJOR INNOVATIONS—WITH A CATCH, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN POL. (Jan. 2020),
http://cfinst.org/pdf/state/ny/Small-Donor-Public-Finance-in-NY_Jan2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N9TY-C2BV]. For the previously published work on New York City, see supra
note 93.
Id. at 8-9, 20.
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and the new contribution limit were assumed to continue giving at the same
level as in 2018. When all of these steps are combined, we were able to
compare the actual distribution of funds in 2018 with a hypothetical
distribution using the same donors and candidates operating under the new
law.121
Subsequent steps in the analysis ran separate “what if” scenarios to go
beyond the old donors under the reasonable assumption that the system
would mobilize new donors and candidates. The “optimistic” scenario
presented here shows the number of donors doubling with each new donor
giving $50. Because of New York States’ low rate of donor participation,
doubling would merely bring the donor participation rate up to the level of
New York City’s, which in turn is about average for all states. It would
certainly be plausible to imagine a higher rate. Tripling the number of
donors would barely bring New York up to the top quartile of states.122 But
the results were dramatic enough without tripling.123
The first set of concerns about New York State’s approach is whether
restricting matching funds geographically would give candidates a strong
enough incentive to recruit more small donors into the system. Whether the
incentive is strong enough will depend upon the matching rate. New York
State’s is significantly higher than those offered in other jurisdictions. The
scenarios showed that (a) almost all candidates would be better off with the
system’s new contribution limits and matching funds than they were under
the status quo, (b) they would raise almost the same amount under the tiered
matching system as under a six-for-one match for contributions statewide,
assuming no new donors in the system, and (c) with at least some new donors,
most of the candidates would do better under within-district matching.124
The following table shows how this can shift the balance of funding for
candidates. It summarizes three different scenarios. The first (or status quo)
scenario shows the actual sources in 2018. The second shows what the same
donors would have generated under the new law. The third shows the results
if the number of donors were to double. The rows do not add to 100%
121
122

123
124

Id. at 20-23.
For the percentage of each state’s adult population that contributes, see Michael J. Malbin &
Brendan Glavin, Large Donors and PACs Continue to Dominate Fundraising in Most of the 50 States, NAT’L
INST. ON MONEY IN POL., at tbl.2 (“Percentage of Each State’s Adults Who Made Contributions
to
Gubernatorial
or
State
Legislative
Candidates”)
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/large-donors-and-pacs-continue-todominate [https://perma.cc/YSM5-PGDZ].
Id.
See MALBIN & GLAVIN, SMALL DONOR PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 119, at 10.
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because some funding sources are omitted from the table. In each case, the
percentage from donors who give $1-$250 includes the value of the matching
funds they generate.125
TABLE: SOURCES OF CANDIDATES’ FUNDS UNDER THREE SCENARIOS
NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
Individuals,
$1-$250

Individuals,
$1,000 up

Non-party
organizations

Actual, 2018

14%

44%

48%

New law,
same donors

62%

7%

25%

New law,
double donors

73%

5%

18%

NEW YORK STATE SENATE
Individuals,
$1-$250

Individuals,
$1,000 up

Non-party
organizations

Actual, 2018

8%

18%

50%

New law,
same donors

45%

10%

31%

New law,
double donors

56%

8%

25%

The table makes it clear that under the status quo, donors who gave $250
or less made up only a small fraction of the funding for Assembly and Senate
candidates in 2018. This was not unusual. In the median state in 2016-19,
donors who gave $1-$250 were responsible for about 12% of legislative and
gubernatorial candidates’ funds.126 This is comparable to the percentages for

125
126

For bar chart representations of the data in this table, see id. at 21-22.
See Malbin & Glavin, Large Donors and PACs, supra note 122, at tbl.3 (“Sources of Candidates’ Funds
in Gubernatorial and Legislative Elections, 2016-2019”).
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the U.S. House.127 But the picture turns around when you add matching
funds for within-district donors and restrict matching to donors who give
$250 or less. The percentage of Assembly candidates’ funds from small
donors (including matching funds) would be 62% of the total, assuming no
new donors. This is comparable to the 63% figure for New York City
Council candidates under the city’s 6:1 match for contributions citywide in
the elections of 2009 and 2013.128 Doubling the donors would heighten the
effect. Instead of being an afterthought in the candidates’ financial
constituency, these donors would become by far the most significant element,
even without doubling. And to reiterate, this rebalancing would occur while
increasing the candidates’ total receipts.
During the New York State Commission’s discussions over this policy,
which the author attended, considerable concern was expressed verbally by
skeptics familiar with the city’s system as to whether non-incumbent
candidates from poor districts could raise enough from within-district donors
to mount credible campaigns. The concern seems plausible but is not borne
out by the data. One good test would be to compare how well potentially
competitive candidates would fare under the new system compared to the
status quo. The data show that Assembly challengers who received at least
one-third of the vote in the general election of 2018 (as well as the incumbents
they faced) would have received substantially more under the new system.
They would also receive more money under the within-district system than
with a straight 6:1 match for all contributions statewide. The same
conclusions held for viable challengers from poorer districts as for all viable
challengers: the challengers from poorer districts would fare better with
public matching funds than without, and they would do at least as well with
a high matching rate limited to contributions within the district as with a
program that spent the same amount of public money to match contributions
from anywhere in the state at a lower matching rate.129
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See MALBIN & GLAVIN, CFI’S GUIDE, supra note 48, at 64-65. Note that these figures are based on
each donor’s aggregate contributions to each candidate over the course of election cycle. Donors
who started out with a small contribution that did not trigger disclosure had their contributions
taken out of the small donor accounting if their cumulative contributions exceeded the threshold.
Because of the way Senate campaign contributions were filed during this period, it was not possible
to derive a comparable figure for Senate donors. The publication used “unitemized” contributions,
for the U.S. Senate, but this included contributions from donors who eventually gave more than
$200. It therefore looks higher than it otherwise would have been had the process been able to use
the more refined “aggregate” figure used for the House and presidency.
See Malbin & Parrott, supra note 93, at 233.
For the assertions in this paragraph, see MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 119, at 10-12, 15.
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D. Comparing Programs, Addressing Questions, Balancing Goals
We began this section by noting that small-donor public financing is often
proposed as a means to help make the donor pool more representative. It is
proposed, in other words, as one method to help redress one of the
weaknesses of Madisonian pluralism. However, these proposals have been
subject to the charge that they would undermine the Madisonian system they
are trying to correct by fostering ideological polarization. We have rebutted
the claims about ideological polarization but agreed with the concern that
using matching funds to multiply the value of a national pool of small donors
could help further rigidify the nationalization of two teams whose collective
electoral interests are served too often by substituting message voting and
position-taking for legislating.
By acknowledging this concern, however, we are not saying that one has
to make a zero-sum choice. Instead, this article put forward a form of smalldonor public financing that is intended both to make the donor pool more
representative and to act as a counterweight to nationalized rigidity. The
policy option is one that would multiply the financial importance of small
donors who live in the district a candidate seeks to represent. Because this
option seeks to balance two goals, it raises two questions: (1) How effective
would it be at redressing pluralism’s imbalances when compared to other
campaign finance policies? (2) What is the theory of change under which such
a program would support (or at least not further undermine) the deliberative
goals of Madisonian representation?
1. Correcting Pluralism
We noted earlier that New York City’s matching fund system has brought
more donors into the system. The small donors have come from virtually
every one of the city’s census block groups, making the donors’
neighborhoods indistinguishable economically and demographically from
the city as a whole.130 But there is one respect in which New York City’s
results do not look as strong as Seattle’s. In 2019, approximately 6% of
Seattle’s adults returned vouchers, which is a substantially higher percentage
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This was a stronger result than Los Angeles’, which showed neither the same bump in participation
nor in demographic representation. Los Angeles is the only other major jurisdiction so far with
multiple-matching funds in effect for more than one election. It matched contributions at
significantly lower rates the New York. For both cities, see Malbin & Parrott, supra note 93 at 24143.
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than the cash donors in New York City.131 Moreover, as reported earlier,
McCabe and Heerwig found the voucher users to be somewhat more
representative of Seattle’s population than its above-$25 cash donors.132
However, comparing Seattle’s 6% of voucher users to New York City’s
small donors does not tell the full story. It is not obvious that Seattle
outperformed New York if the goal is to bring about a durable change that
results in having more diverse elements of the city remaining engaged long
enough to influence legislatures. The combined findings do tell us that a
larger (and more representative) pool of small donors contributes when
matching funds give candidates a financial incentive to find and mobilize
them than if there is no public incentive. They also tell us even more donors
will give if they can use “free money.” But these observations do not tell us
about long-term effects. It seems reasonable to suspect (or speculate) that
those who give at least some money of their own would remain more
attentive than the ones who use vouchers. Maintaining small donors’
attention between elections may also depend upon intermediary
organizations mobilizing them, both in the donating and governing phases
of a typical cycle. These speculations seem likely, but no one has done the
research to confirm it. Such research requires tracking the political and
organizational networks within communities along with tracking whether
first-time donors remain engaged over several cycles both as donors and in
other capacities.
Even with the appropriate research for these cities, one would still have
to extrapolate the findings beyond cities to larger jurisdictions. The
policymakers in New York State thought it unlikely that the neighborhood
fundraising methods used to mobilize small donors in city elections would
become the norm in a statewide election for governor. Their skepticism
seems plausible. The same problem would be even more glaring if one tried
to extrapolate from Seattle to a national stage. The city of Seattle has almost
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The number of adults returning vouchers in 2019 was 38,092. SEATTLE ETHICS & ELECTIONS
COMMISSION, DEMOCRACY VOUCHER PROGRAM: BIENNIAL REPORT 10 (2019),
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/EthicsElections/DemocracyVoucher/2019_
Biennial_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/947K-DR3T] (last visited Aug. 2, 2020). Seattle’s adult
population (18 and older) was 639,870. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts, Seattle City,
Washington, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/seattlecitywashington,US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/XYU8-KRJF] (last visited July 28, 2020). The city’s full population was
estimated at 753,675 in 2019. See Id.
McCabe & Heerwig, Diversifying the Donor Pool, supra note 97, at 330-33, 336-37.
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exactly the population of one average-sized congressional district.133 It is a
jurisdiction manageable enough for a candidate to raise funds city-wide
through face-to-face meetings set up by networks of supporters. One should
not expect this kind of fundraising to be the norm if the donors could steer
vouchers where ever they wish across the nation. It seems more likely that
the candidates, parties, and donors would use web-based platforms to steer
money to tossup races that would determine national majorities. As
previously argued, it is not problematic per se to have donors giving small
contributions to influence national results. The policy question is whether to
use public matching funds or vouchers to multiply this money. It would not
be difficult in principle to structure a voucher system with geographic
restrictions parallel to the ones in New York State. That would make the
two systems parallel in this respect. If one then had to choose between
vouchers and matching funds, the issue would then turn on research about
the spillover participation effects, along with issues of administration and
compliance.
Skeptics could always argue, of course, that no such program should be
adopted without conclusive research behind it. But that argument would cut
against most policy changes in most issue domains. The claim that either
multiple matching funds or vouchers would be likely to address the problems
of pluralism seems powerful based on the evidence available so far. The
question then is whether this approach would also bring about collateral
damage, or whether it is likely to help rather than harm the deliberative
process.
2. Theory of Change
When we move from the donors to legislative behavior, it is worth
dwelling for a moment to consider how programs such as these might help
to accomplish what has been claimed. No one would suggest that withindistrict matching funds or vouchers could resurrect Madisonian deliberation
by itself. Rather, the claim is that within-district programs can help. They
would work to counter the impact of nationalized interest groups by
strengthening the financial ties between representatives and their geographic
constituents with the idea that this, in turn, will affect legislative

133

For Seattle’s population of 753,675 in 2019, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 131. The Census
Bureau has also announced that as of April 1, 2021, its national population count was 331,449,281;
please see the “population clock” on the Census Bureau home page at census.gov for updated
information. That national count divided by 435 equals 761,952.
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institutions.134 As of this writing, there is not a sufficiently tested empirical
basis for accepting or rejecting these claims.135 However, we can present why
we consider the expectations plausible.
Earlier we suggested that potentially threatened officeholders’ fears of
nationally-funded attack ads lead them now to see party, party-related, and
national issue or interest group support as their only effective responses. But
many candidates who accept within-district matching funds will use them to
build local networks of campaign supporters and volunteers to find local
donors who in turn became parts of the volunteer networks.136 It seems likely
that networks such as these will help inoculate officeholders against outside
money. While not dispositive, city council candidates who participated in
Seattle’s voucher system in 2019 withstood massive independent spending
against them by Amazon.137 Local networks may or may not be sufficient in
a congressional race. Party support might still be needed. But the local
networks at a minimum would be significant counterweights to spending by
outsiders.
We have already presented evidence to show this would likely change the
economic and demographic mixture of donors. People with less money and
from more diverse backgrounds could afford to give. Candidates would have
an incentive to mobilize them. However, unlike the donors to ActBlue and
WinRed, the donors responding to these incentives would be mobilized
locally. If the fundraising occurred largely in face-to-face local meetings,
there would be reason to believe the donors would be less ideologically
uniform and more diverse in their issue positions. They could perhaps even

134

135

136

137

To be clear, as noted earlier, this is not about whether local, state, or national governments are better
positioned to serve one or another public need. It is not about federalism. It is about the
connections between representatives, the constituents they serve, and legislatures at all levels of
government.
But for suggestive analogies, see Anne E. Baker Getting Short Changed? The Impact of Outside Money on
District Representation 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 1096 (2016); Anne E. Baker, The Partisan and Policy Motivations
of Political Donors Seeking Surrogate Representation in House Elections POL. BEHAV. 1035 (2019)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09531-2 [https://perma.cc/97DJ-3XW8].
Related to this expectation is recent work by Charles Russell Hunt on the importance of local roots
to a member’s reelection. Hunt finds that “deeply-rooted legislators require significantly less
campaign spending to achieve results compared to otherwise-similar legislators without deep local
roots.” Charles Russell Hunt, Home Field Advantage: Roots, Reelection, and Representation in
the Modern Congress (2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with
the University of Maryland, College Park).
See Nick Nyhart & Adam Eichen, Grassroots Money Beats Amazon in Seattle, THE AM. PROSPECT (Nov.
15,
2019),
https://prospect.org/politics/grassroots-money-beats-amazon-in-seattle/
[https://perma.cc/442Q-73UE] (“As all the mail-in ballots were finally counted days later, it
became clear that Amazon and their allies had lost, handily.”).
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be more like the small donors in the earlier study of donors in state elections,
who were less extreme ideologically than large donors,138 although it would
be a stretch to expect that based on a single outdated study. But whether less
extreme or not, they would probably be more diverse and less likely to fit
neatly in two vitriolically opposed camps.
Let us assume at least some of this is true about the donors. How might
this translate into changes that could affect the balance between
backbenchers and leaders in a manner helpful to deliberation inside
Congress? One should expect backbenchers who depend on a mobilized
constituent base to be less likely to cede quite so much of their policymaking
power to the leadership and its staff. They would have an interest in pursuing
their policy goals through formal committees and other means. Over time,
as new leadership candidates bargain with members to win their positions,
one could also imagine—not predict, but imagine—members demanding
more autonomy for their committees, perhaps even including the right to
have committees elect their chairs. Well short of this, members are likely to
carve out a more meaningful role for Congressional Member Organizations
(such as the bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus) to develop, promote, and
push for floor votes on serious legislative alternatives (or supplements) to the
leaderships’ preferred packages.139 None of this could be accomplished
through reforms delivered from on high. In line with the conditional party
government theory, the expectation has to be that institutional structure will
follow the needs of members and members will respond to the needs of their
constituents.
It is important not to go overboard here. First, the claim is not that
buttressing local ties through campaign finance law would itself reverse the
138
139

Joe, et al., supra, note 103.
The Problem Solvers Caucus was deeply involved in negotiating the compromise package on
COVID-19 relief at the end of 2020, although the negotiations in the end were led by the party
leaders. See Brandi Buchman, “Problem Solvers Caucus Proposes More COVID-19 Relief
Options,”
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERVICE
(Dec.
14,
2020)
https://www.courthousenews.com/problem-solvers-caucus-proposes-more-covid-19-reliefoptions/ [https://perma.cc/3G4G-8S59] (outlining the Problem Solvers Caucus proposal for
relief); see also Burgess Everett, Heather Caygle & Marianne Levin, “Feuds, Zoom, and Italian Food:
How
the
Stimulus
Got
Done,”
POLITICO
(Dec.
21,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/21/how-stimulus-bill-got-done-449722
[https://perma.cc/S98W-FHND] (discussing the party leader negotiations that were inspired by
Problem Solvers Caucus members); Lindsay McPherson, “Bipartisan Group’s Success on COVID19 Relief Could Just Be the Beginning,” ROLL CALL (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/12/23/bipartisan-groups-success-on-covid-relief-could-just-bethe-beginning/ [https://perma.cc/ZYR4-SXXX] (arguing that the Problem Solvers may play a
greater role in future policymaking).
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powerful forces that have led to centralized leadership in Congress, weaker
committees, and a heightened sense of negative partisanship.140 The
incentives behind these institutional developments run deep. But ideas such
as these could lean against the prevailing winds by creating constituencybased backstops to support a politician’s willingness to stand up to national
issue groups.
Second, it could be argued against this point of view that the leaders
would simply create end-runs, making the innovation worthless. The leaders
could react to constituency-based matching funds by increasing the dues
payments demanded of members for desirable committee positions. The
reply is that the leaders already pressure the members to raise money for the
party. The hope—admittedly with no guarantee—is that diversifying the
sources for campaign funds creates counter-pressures in the larger system.
This cannot be done with contribution, spending limits, or a constitutional
amendment to reach independent spending. It also requires something more
than simply handing public grant money to candidates. It calls for giving
candidates and local parties the incentive to build local political organizations
in the expectation (or hope) that this will in turn give the members at least
one degree of separation from the national forces that dominate political
finance today.
Finally, this is not an argument for a Congress with chaotically weak
parties. Any basic understanding of legislative behavior teaches us that it is
easier to provide short-term benefits than to accept short-term costs in return
for longer-term benefits. Political parties make it possible for members to
join ideas in a package and then create procedures both to protect members
from exposure and assure those who join the bargain that their interests will
not be jettisoned on the floor. However, there must be a middle ground
between hopelessly weak parties and today’s parties that so strongly favor
messaging over deliberation. One reason to consider emphasizing
constituency-based fundraising is to create more play in the joints for these
middle grounds to be explored.

140

For an example of how deeply these forces run, consider the connections between broadband
access, self-selection by audiences of their information sources, and partisan hostility in Yphtach
Lelkes, Gaurav Sood & Shanto Iyengar, “The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband
Internet on Partisan Affect,” 61(1) AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 5-20 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
This article casts a metaphorical net in two directions. It urges campaign
finance reformers to take institutional concerns seriously. Representative
democracies depend upon deliberative institutions to make decisions that
serve the long-term public interest. Today’s nationalized teamsmanship has
harmed Congress’s deliberative capacities. Doing more of the same will not
produce different results. This point applies most clearly to the idea that
unlimited contributions to the national parties will produce better
government. But a similar point could be applied to policies that would
multiply the value of web-based contributions, many of which would be
mobilized by essentially the same national parties and issue groups. The
political difference between these two approaches is about which national
factions should have more power.
Neither improves institutional
performance.
At the same time, however, the article urges institutionalists to listen to
those left aside. Just as wisdom requires deliberation, so does legitimacy
require citizens of all backgrounds to have the sense they can be heard.
These goals are not contradictory; they belong together. Public resources
can and should help to correct pluralism’s flaws, but that correction should
be designed simultaneously with an eye toward deliberative institutions. It is
certainly possible, with a broad enough vision, to look both ways. The
coming years require no less.

December 2021]

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

957

APPENDIX
SELECTED CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM GOALS
The opening pages of this article referred to a sampling of the goals often
put forward as being among the primary objectives of campaign finance
reform. The following is a non-exhaustive survey grouped under three
headings: reforms intended to prevent or deter certain relationships between
policy-makers and donors; reforms intended to promote a more egalitarian
democracy, and reforms designed to affect election campaigning. Sources
for a more complete discussion of each goal are cited in the footnotes.
• Goals that relate to preventing or deterring undesirable behavior
by public officials:
o Reduce or deter corruption;141
o Reduce the appearance of corruption or impropriety;142
o Reduce undue influence on the part of major donors;143
o Reduce the financial dependence of candidates and
parties on major donors (sometimes called
“dependency” corruption).144
• Goals aimed at equality, descriptive representation, and related
goals:
o Promote greater equality of among those who put
money into the system;145

141

142

143

144

145

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), at 25-32, 67-68. For histories of the concept of corruption in
campaign finance law, see KURT HOHENSTEIN, COINING CORRUPTION: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM (2007); ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A
HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2014); TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra
note 2. For a review of the variety of definitions put forward for “corruption” in judicial decisions
on campaign finance, see Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-32, 67-68 (1976). For a critique of the “appearance” standard, see
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 301, 326 (1989).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 53, 69-70, 76. See also Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign
Contributions on Public Policy, 11(3) THE FORUM: J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 339 (2013) (noting
the impacts of the current campaign finance system on policy outcomes).
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT, at 15-20, 125-30, 230-46 (2011) (describing the dependency model of corruption and
how reform would improve the situation).
See HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 86, at 84-103 (remarking on the vastly unequal levels
of involvement in the current system and proposing a more egalitarian way forward).
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Promote greater policy alignment between the
preferences of the median citizen and legislative
outcomes;146
o Enhance financial participation by a larger and more
diverse set of donors;147
o Open the candidate pool to a larger and more diverse set
of potential office holders;148
o Increase candidates’ financial dependence on their
geographic constituents.149
Goals aimed at altering the quality of elections:
o Increase competition.150
o

•

146

147

148

149
150

See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1428 (2015)
(arguing that money can skew representation and that reform conversely can better align voter
preferences with government actions).
See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1259-61 (2012); see also Malbin,
Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 93; Malbin, Small Donors, supra note 90; and Malbin & Parrott, supra note
93 (all noting how reform can mobilize a more heterogenous set of donors).
See MALBIN, CITIZEN FUNDING FOR ELECTIONS, supra note 94, at 17-18 (discussing the candidate
diversity implications of reform); Keith E. Hamm & Robert E. Hogan, Campaign Finance Laws and
Candidacy Decisions in State Legislative Elections, 61 (3) POL. RES. Q. 458, 466 (2008) (finding a positive
relationship between more stringent campaign finance laws and candidates emerging to challenge
incumbents); MICHAEL G. MILLER, SUBSIDIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW PUBLIC FUNDING
CHANGES ELECTIONS AND HOW IT CAN WORK IN THE FUTURE 80-107, 107 (2014) (finding a
connection between public financing and the emergence of “a different kind of legislator”).
Contrary conclusions are drawn by Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse in Money That Draws No
Interest: Public Financing of Legislative Elections and Candidate Emergence, 14(4) ELECTION L. J. 392 (2015)
and by Mitchell Kilborn in Public Campaign Financing, Candidate Socioeconomic Diversity, and
Representational Inequality at the U.S. State Level: Evidence from Connecticut, 18(3) ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 296
(2018).
Fontana, supra note 117.
For one book that lists competition as first among the desired goals, see FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY
IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1988), 361-62. For reviews of the empirical literature on the
relationship between campaign finance reform and competition, see Jeff Milyo, Campaign Spending
and Electoral Competition: Towards More Policy Relevant Research, 11(3) THE FORUM: J. APPLIED RES.
CONTEMP. POL. 437 (2013); Fortier & Malbin, supra note 26, at 459-61. See also Neil Malhotra, The
Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 ST. POLITICS &
POLICY Q. 263 (2008); Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner & Amanda Williams, Do Public Funding
Programs Enhance Electoral Competition?, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL
COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 245 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006);
Costas Panagopoulos, Leveling the Playing Field: Publicly Financed Campaigns and Electoral Competition, in
PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 176-77, 182 (Costas Panagopoulos ed., 2011) (citing
Costas Panagopoulos & Donald Green, Field Experiments Testing the Impact of Radio Advertisements on
Electoral Competition, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 156 (2008)).
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Encourage candidates to spend more time on direct
voter contact;151
Deter blatantly misleading or scurrilous advertising;152
and
Help voters make informed choices.153

MILLER, supra note 148, at 46-63, finds that candidates in states with full public financing spend
more of their time in direct contact with voters.
This connection was made by Rep. David Price (D-NC) when he introduced the “Stand by Your
Ad” provision that became part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. His statement
at the time is quoted by Michael M. Franz, Joel Rivlin & Kenneth Goldstein in Much More of the
Same: Television Advertising Pre- and Post BCRA, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY,
POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 145, 163 (M. Malbin ed., 2006). In
2019, the same Rep. Price introduced a bill called the “Stand by Every Ad” Act to expand this
provision. See Press Release, David Price, Rep. Price Says “Take Back Our Politics” with Introduction of
Democracy Reform Bills (July 25, 2019), https://price.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-pricesays-take-back-our-politics-introduction-democracy-reform-bills
[https://perma.cc/96LYKAMQ].
See Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 1, at 14-15, 66-76, 81, 83 (listing information as one of the reasons
for disclosure). For a review of the scholarly literature on the informational value of disclosure, see
Abby Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 1-24
(2018).

